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21 Introduction
1.1 Background
On the 17 of July 1998, the United Nations Diplomatic Conference in Rome
voted to adopt the Statute of an International Criminal Court. The UN
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, closed the ceremony this day by stating that
the Statute was a ”gift of hope to future generations, and a giant step forward
in the march towards universal human rights”. For the first time in history
there will be a permanent, international judicial body empowered to
prosecute and punish the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community. In the International Criminal Court we will have a new
instrument that will replace a culture of impunity with a culture of
accountability. The Statute represents an urgent step to fill the gap of
efficient enforcement mechanisms for human rights and humanitarian law.
The Statute has been described as a milestone in the efforts to end impunity
of the most serious international crimes; by holding individuals accountable
the Court can have a deterrent effect on future crimes.
1.2 Purpose and delimitation of the topic
The purpose of this thesis is to assess if the Statute adopted in Rome will
found a Court that can realise the above mentioned potentials and that can
fulfil the high expectations put on it. In order for the Court to perform its
tasks of dispensing justice and acting as a deterrent, it must be credible,
independent and effective. In this paper I will address the question whether
the Court will have the prospects to live up to those criteria. The credibility,
effectiveness and independence of the Court will be determined by a set of
interrelated issues; involving its relationship with the UN Security Council,
the Court’s jurisdiction, the potential for politisation of the Court and the
support from the states. These issues are however incompatible to some
extent and have to be balanced against each other. One first area of
contradiction is the support from the states and the Court’s jurisdiction in a
broad sense. The credibility of the Court is closely determined by what kind
of crimes it is empowered to hear. If the cases that are prosecuted by the
Court are arbitrarily and selectively chosen the Court will lose credibility
and the states will refuse to refer cases and co-operate in other ways. If the
states are given too wide possibilities to refuse the Court’s jurisdiction the
work of the Court could be paralysed. On one hand the Court should have a
wide jurisdiction and should have the possibility to prosecute the crimes
under its jurisdiction wherever in the world they are committed. On the
other hand the effectiveness of the Court is to a great extent depending on
the political will of the states. In fact the Court will not even come into
existence if the Statute is not ratified by 60 states or more. The ratification
of as many states as possible is important in order for the Court to function
3properly. The Court would be the most effective if the Statute received
universal ratification. Therefore, there has to be a balance in the Statute so
that the rules give the Court enough strength to work effectively, but the
rules should not be so strong that they discourage the states from ratifying
the Statute.
Another delicate balancing concerns the Court’s relationship with the
Security Council, the Court’s jurisdiction and the fear of politisation of the
Court.  On one hand, the Court’s credibility and judicial independence will
be in danger if it is subject to the political influence of the Security Council.
On the other hand the Council could support the Court with cases, and
extend the Court’s jurisdictional reach to the whole world. The question of
what role the Council should play in the Court, without questioning its
judicial independence, is complicated by the fact that the Council derives its
powers from the UN Charter, a document that is overriding the Rome
Statute. Since it was not open to the Rome Conference to confer a new
power to the Security Council, or to control the exercise of the existing
powers, it is important to fully understand what powers the Council have
under the UN Charter, before one can assess what role it will play in the
Court’s future. In this thesis I will address and try to answer the question if
the right balance has been struck in these cases and if the fruit of the
Conference in Rome has the prospects of becoming an effective,
independent and credible Court.
The thesis will only discuss issues that concern the Court’s jurisdiction in a
broad sense. It will deal with the subject matter jurisdiction, the
preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction and the question of what entities
that can trigger the Court’s jurisdiction. Also the part on the Court’s
relationship with the Security Council will concentrate on the role the
Council will have in triggering and barring the Courts jurisdiction. Other
interesting issues, such as the state parties obligation to co-operate with the
Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes, and the Security
Council’s role in ensuring compliance with these obligations will be left
aside.
1.3 Method and material
In order to answer these questions I have scrutinised the negotiating process
from the first Draft Statute, proposed by the International Law Commission
in 1994, till the final Statute adopted in Rome. The thesis is mainly based on
the material from the different Committees that have been negotiating the
Statute on the way to Rome as well as the material from the Rome
Conference, where state delegations compromised their different views into
the Statute. The different opinions of the delegations, the arguments and
counter arguments for different solutions, will be presented and discussed. I
have also used material from different human rights organisations and other
non-governmental organisations that closely followed the negotiations.
4During the negotiating process and after the adoption of the Statute, many
articles were written on the subject. A great number of these are written by
members of the different delegations in the negotiations. The views
forwarded in these articles are however not representing the views of their
governments, but should be seen as the writers’ personal opinions.
In the descriptive chapter on the Security Council, I have relied on the
fundamental literature on the subject, such as Simma’s and
Benwitch/Martin’s commentaries to the UN Charter as well as Kelsen’s
analysis of the law of the UN. More critical and up-to-date material has
however been used in the part concerning the Council’s use of powers.
Among the material used is Österdahl’s critical study of the Council’s use,
or misuse, of its power to interpret its own jurisdiction, and articles
commenting on the Council’s action in the most important international
crisis.
1.4 Disposition
Since I use this method it is important to understand how the negotiating
process has worked. I will therefore begin this thesis with a chapter on the
historical background of the Court, which will begin at the time of World
War I and the dream of an international criminal court, and continue through
the different steps in the negotiating process, up until the adoption of the
Rome Statute. In the third chapter I will briefly describe the crimes that are
under the Court’s jurisdiction and comment on the reasons for choosing
these crimes. In chapter four I will more thoroughly analyse the
preconditions that have to be met before the Court can exercise its
jurisdiction. In chapter five of the thesis the different trigger mechanisms
will be discussed. I will present the entities that can trigger the Court’s
jurisdiction and discuss what implications these powers have for the
effectiveness, impartiality and credibility of the Court. The remaining part of
the thesis will be devoted to the Court’s future relationship with the UN
Security Council. The first chapter in this part, chapter 6, will present the
powers that the Council has been given through the UN Charter, how the
Council has developed these powers in its practise and what the legal and
political limitations to these powers are. I will go quite deep into these
questions since I think it is important to see how the Council has worked
and made use of its powers in the past, in order to establish how the Council
will function in relation to the Court in the future. In the 7th chapter I will go
deeper into the question of what problems and potentials that will become
relevant in the relationship between the Council, as a political entity, and the
Court as a judicial organ. The following two chapters will take up the two
powers given to the Council in relation to the Court’s jurisdiction. Chapter 8
will deal with the Council’s power to refer cases to the Court and chapter 9
its power to defer the Court’s jurisdiction. In the concluding 10th chapter I
hope to give a good picture of what the strengths and weaknesses are in the
5Statute and an opinion on whether the Court has the prospects of fulfilling
the goals it has been set up to meet.
62 Historical background
2.1 The dream of an international criminal court
The idea of a permanent criminal court is nothing new. The First World War
is usually seen as the starting point of the efforts to create such an
institution.1 At the end of World War I, the Allies established a commission
to investigate and recommend action on war crimes committed by the
defeated Central Powers. After the War, the Treaty of Sevres and the Treaty
of Versailles, respectively, provided for the prosecution of Turkish and
German war criminals before international tribunals.2 However no
international tribunals were established for this purpose.3 Despite this
experience of failure in the effort to establish war crime tribunals after the
First World War, the Allies decided to conduct such trials at the conclusion
of World War II. In August 1945, the victorious governments of France, the
United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union met in London and
concluded an agreement providing for the establishment of the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg to try the Germans accused of crimes
against the peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.4 The indictments
were filed on 18 October 1945 and judgements were given on 1 October
1946.5 On 19 January 1946 an International Tribunal for the Far East was
also established in Tokyo. The Tribunal started its work on 29 April 1946
and judgement was read out 4-12 November 1948.6 The Tribunals in
Nuremberg and Tokyo has regularly been the object of criticism, the two
major reasons being that they were applying victor’s justice and ex post
facto law. Only the acts of the vanquished were judged, although, at least in
the field of war crimes, the Allies had regularly committed crimes as well.
Furthermore, especially the crime against peace was considered by several
critics as not being part of international law, at least not at the time the acts
were committed. 7
                                                
1 There are however examples in the literature of so-called precedents of international
criminal courts in much older days. See e.g. V. Morris and  M.P. Scarf, An Insider’s Guide
to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Vol.1, 1995, p.1, where
reference is made to the trial of Peter von Hagenback in 1474.   
2 H. von Hebel, An International Criminal Court - A Historical Perspective, In: Reflections
on the International Criminal Court, 1999, p. 13-38, at p.15-16
3 Trials against the Germans were instead held before the German Supreme Court sitting in
Leipzig. Of the 896 Germans accused of war crimes only twelve were tried and of those
only six were convicted. See C. Bassiouni, V.P Nanda,  A Treatise on International
Criminal Law, 1973, p.566-567
4 V. Morris and  M.P. Scharf, 1995, p.1
5 Of the twenty-two German officials who were tried at Nuremberg, nineteen were found
guilty; of those twelve were sentenced to death.
6 A total of 28 persons were tried by this Tribunal and all of them were convicted.
7 M. K. Marler, The International Criminal Court: Assessing the Jurisdictional Loopholes
in the Rome Statute, In: Duke Law Journal, No.3, 1999, p.825-853, at p.827
7During and after Nuremberg, many states and non-governmental
organisations began to recognise that a permanent international tribunal
would be necessary to deal with such outrages in the future.8 In 1948, the
General Assembly requested the International Law Commission to study the
desirability and feasibility of establishing an international penal tribunal9
and in 1950 the General Assembly decided to establish a Committee to draft
a statute for an international criminal court.10 The Committee submitted a
draft statute in 195111, which was subsequently modified in 1953.12 The
consideration for this topic was then sidelined for decades by the Cold
War.13 Serious violations of humanitarian law occurred under the Cold War
period, but no international regime existed to punish offenders.
In 1989, with the Cold War coming to a close, the ILC took up its work on a
draft statute for an international criminal court. The violations of
international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, as well as the
genocide in Rwanda, provided dramatic confirmation that an international
criminal court was indeed still needed. For the establishment of ad hoc
tribunals for these situations see 6.7.4. It is in this context sufficient to state
that the creation of these tribunals represented a significant step forward in
the prosecution of international crimes. Richard Goldstone, the original
chief prosecutor for both tribunals described them as “the first real
international attempt to enforce international humanitarian law.”14 The
creation of the Yugoslav Tribunal had a positive influence on the work of
the ILC.
2.2 The negotiating process
It was not until 1992 that the ILC undertook a more in debt analysis of the
issue of creating an international criminal court. In resolution 47/33 of 25
November 199215, the UN General Assembly asked the ILC to continue its
work as a matter of priority. A Working Group was set up to elaborate a set
of draft articles, including short commentaries, and in 1994 the ILC finished
its work and presented its Draft Statute16 to the General Assembly. The ILC
                                                
8 Ibid.
9 G.A. Resolution 260 B (III) of 9 December 1948
10 G.A. Resolution 489 (V) of 12 December 1950
11 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court prepared by the Committee on
International Criminal Jurisdiction, UN GAOR, Seventh Session, Supplement No.11,
A/2136 (1952)
12 Revised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court prepared by the Committee on
International Criminal Jurisdiction, UN GAOR, Ninth Session, Supplement No.12, A/2645
(1954)
13 H. von Hebel, 1999, p. 22-26
14 See B. O’Hara-Foster, Justice Goes Global, In: Time International, July 27, 1998, p. 46
(quoting Richard Goldstone)   
15 G.A Resolution 47/33, UN Doc. A/RES/47/33 (1992)
16 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 2
May-22 July 1994, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Chapter II.B.I, UN
8recommended to the General Assembly “that it convene an international
conference of plenipotentiaries to study the Draft Statute and to conclude a
convention on the establishment of an International Criminal Court.”17 The
Draft Statute was well received in the Sixth Committee of the General
Assembly in autumn 1994. Still, however, a number of states expressed
reservations on an International Criminal Court.18  Most states agreed that
some preparatory work was needed before such a Conference could take
place. By resolution 49/53 of 9 December 199419, the General Assembly
created an Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, in an attempt to eliminate some of the controversy
surrounding the Draft Statute. The Committee was open to all states and had
the mandate to review and discuss the Draft Statute and offer
recommendations in anticipation of an international conference of
plenipotentiaries. The Ad Hoc Committee, in which about 60 delegations
participated, met twice in 1995, and managed to fulfil its mandate and to
discuss the most important issues.20 21 However, it took the Committee
considerable time to deal with the question how to proceed. Although some
delegations considered that more general discussions were still needed,
before a decision could be taken on a possible Diplomatic Conference, other
states were of the view that the mandate should be changed into preparing a
draft text of the Statute, with a view of holding a Diplomatic Conference in
the close future.22 The Ad Hoc Committee finally came to a compromise
according to which “issues can be addressed most effectively by combining
further discussions with the drafting of texts, with the view to preparing a
consolidated text of a convention for an International Criminal Court as the
next step towards consideration by a conference of plenipotentiaries.”23
This suggestion was followed by the General Assembly: a Preparatory
Committee was established which had the mandate to “discuss further the
major […] issues arising out of the draft Statute” and to prepare a “widely
acceptable consolidated text of a convention for an International Criminal
Court”.24 The Prep Com met in 1996, 1997 and March-April 1998. In the
beginning of its work, the meetings were public and the discussions are
presented in reports.25 In order to promote the negotiations and the
                                                                                                                           
GAOR, Forty-Ninth Session, Supplement No.10/A/49/10 (1994),  Hereinafter ILC Draft
Statute
17 ILC Draft Statute, paras. 23-91
18 Topical Summary of the discussions held in the Sixth Committee of the General
Assembly during its Forty-Ninth Session, A/CN.4/464/Add.1 of 22 February, 1995.
19 G.A. Resolution 49/53, UN Doc. A/RES/49/53 (1995)
20 H. von Hebel, 1999, p.33
21 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, UN GOAR, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No.22, A/50/22 (1995),  Hereinafter Ad
Hoc Committee Report
22 H. von Hebel, 1999, p.33
23 Ad Hoc Committee Report, para. 259
24 G.A Resolution 50/45, UN Doc. A/RES/50/45 (1995)
25 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court Vol. 1 (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during March-April and August
1996) UN GOAR, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No.22 A/51/22 (1996) and Vol. II
9development of compromises, the Prep Com, as of 1997, did not meet
anymore in public plenary sessions. Accordingly, no records were made of
the meetings and only the outcome of the discussions, in the form of draft
articles, were reproduced.26 On 3 April 1998, during its last session, the Prep
Com adopted a Draft Statute, which it submitted to the Conference.27
On 15 June, the Diplomatic Conference on an International criminal Court
was opened in Rome. 160 states participated in the Conference. The most
important organ of the Conference was the Committee of the Whole, it was
here the substantive discussions took place. By 16 July, the result of the
discussions on all parts of the Statute were collected and the text was sent to
the plenary of the Conference. The Statue was adopted on the 17 of July
1998, by 120 in favour, 7 against and 21 abstentions.28
                                                                                                                           
(Compilation of Proposals) UN GOAR, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No.22A,  A/51/22
(1996) Hereinafter Prep Com Report, Vol. I and Prep Com Report Vol. II
26 Decisions taken by the Preparatory Committee at it session held from 11 to 21 February,
1997, A/AC.249/1997/L.5 (1997), Decisions taken by the Preparatory Committee at it
session held from 4 to 15 August 1997, A/AC.249/1997/L.8/Rev.1 (1997) and Decisions
taken by the Preparatory Committee at it session held from 1 to 12 December, 1997,
A/AC.249/1997/L.9/Rev.1 (1997)
27 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory Committee on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court submitted to the Rome Conference,
A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (14 April 1998)
28 H. von Hebel, 1999, p.37
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3 Crimes within the Jurisdiction
of the Court
Article 5 of the Statute gives the Court jurisdiction over the most serious
crimes in the international community; genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes. I will not go into the specific definitions of these crimes, but
merely touch upon the issues that are of relevance for this paper.
The definition of genocide is taken from the 1948 Genocide Convention.29
It covers specifically listed acts, such as killing and causing serious harm,
committed with an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethic,
racial or religious group.30 The rights of existence, which is the positive side
of genocide, is an important human right that will be more effectively
protected through the Statute.
Crimes against humanity cover those specifically listed acts, such as
murder, extermination, rape, sexual slavery, crime of apartheid, etc.,
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population.31 Crimes against humanity are traditionally seen as the
crimes committed in wartime, and that they in a way ‘take over where the
human rights leave off’. The Statute does however not mention a connection
with armed conflicts, either of international or national character, and thus
confirms that crimes against humanity, like the crime of genocide, are as
applicable in peacetime as they are in wartime. This convergence or
overlapping of humanitarian law and some serious human rights violations
gives strength to the human rights since these crimes become criminalised
under the Statute.
Under Article 8(1) the ICC has jurisdiction in respect of war crimes “in
particular when committed as a part of a plan or policy or as a part of a
large-scale commission of such crimes”. Article 8(2) provides an extensive
list of war crimes “for the purpose of this Statute” It deals in turn with
international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts. The
inclusion of the latter provision was the subject of major controversy at the
Rome Conference. A minority of states wanted non-international armed
conflicts excluded from the subject matter jurisdiction.32 The war crimes
listed in Article 8 cover grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
other serious violations committed on a large scale in international armed
                                                
29 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December
1948, 78 UNTS 277.
30 Article 6. All Articles in this chapter refer to the Statute of the Court, if nothing else is
stated.
31 Article 7
32 D. McGoldrick, The Permanent International Criminal Court: An End to the Culture of
Impunity? In: The Criminal Law Review, August 1999, p.627-655, at. p.636
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conflicts and some violations committed in non-international armed
conflicts.
The reason for limiting the jurisdiction of the Court to these core crimes was
the belief that it would provide a broader acceptance of the Statute and that
it would enhance the credibility, moral authority and effectiveness of the
Court.33 In addition, it will avoid overloading the Court with cases that can
be dealt with adequately by national courts. The selection of crimes was also
related to the Court’s future role. Limiting the Court’s competence to a few
core crimes would facilitate designing a coherent and unified approach to
the exercise of jurisdiction and state co-operation.34 Including other crimes,
such as aggression, drug trafficking and terrorism, could have prevented the
Conference from finalising the Statute.35 If the Court becomes effective it is
possible that the jurisdiction is extended to other crimes. It is probable that
such incorporation will at first-hand be of the so-called “treaty-based”
crimes, but it is also possible that more human rights related crimes can be
incorporated.
                                                
33 Ad Hoc Committee Report, para. 54
34 M.H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, In: American
Journal of International Law, Vol.93, no.1, January 1999, p. 22-42, at p.25
35 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, The Rome Treaty for an International Criminal
Court; A Brief Summary of the Main Issues, International Criminal Court Briefing Series
Volume 2, Number  1, August 1998, p.4
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4 Preconditions to the Exercise
of Jurisdiction
4.1 Automatic jurisdiction or “opt-in/op-out”
regime?
4.1.1 General
An important question concerning the jurisdiction and the effectiveness of
the Court is how and when the states give their consent to the Court’s
jurisdiction. There were mainly two options that were discussed at the Rome
Conference; the so-called “opt-in/opt-out” regime and the approach of
automatic jurisdiction.36 37 Automatic jurisdiction means that a state
automatically accepts the jurisdiction of the Court when it ratifies or accedes
the Convention. No additional declaration of acceptance of specific
categories of crimes is needed. According to the “opt-in/opt-out” regime, on
the other hand, becoming a party to the Statute does not automatically mean
that the state accepts the Courts jurisdiction. A state can ratify the treaty
establishing the Court and retain the right to choose the crimes for which it
will accept the Court's jurisdiction. The state parties to the Statute can
selectively accept or reject the competence for specific crimes and for
specific period of times.
4.1.2 Arguments in favour of an “opt-in/opt-out” regime
The separation between membership and jurisdiction is the traditional one
when it comes to instruments that create a court or a tribunal.38 Traditionally,
being a party to such an instrument does not entail acceptance of the
jurisdiction of the court or tribunal, but the acceptance of jurisdiction usually
requires additional consent.39 This approach was the one chosen by the
International Law Commission in its Draft Statute.40 According to the Draft
Statute the Court would have automatic jurisdiction only over genocide.
                                                
36 H. P. Kaul, Special Note: The Struggle for the International Criminal Court’s
Jurisdiction, In: European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 1998,
No.4, p. 364-376, at p. 366
37 There were a number of more choices presented and discussed at the Rome Conference,
among them variants of the automatic jurisdiction approach and a French proposal of “state
consent regime”. For the purpose of this paper it is however not necessary to discuss these
proposals, but I will only present the main options and their implications for the
effectiveness of the Court.
38 See e.g. Article 36 of the ICJ Statute
39 R. S. Lee, Creating an International Criminal Court - of Procedures and Compromises,
In: Reflections on the International Criminal Court, 1999, p.141-152, at. p.147
40 Article 22 of the ILC Draft Statute
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With respect to other crimes the International Law Commission advocated
the opt-in approach. In these cases the Court would not have been able to act
unless its jurisdiction over the crime had been accepted by the state with
custody over the suspect and by the state on whose territory the act had
occurred. A special declaration would have been required either when the
state became a party or subsequently. Such a declaration could have been
general, or subject to limitations regarding the crimes involved or the time
period covered. Additionally, once a state had opted in, it still would have
retained the possibility to opt out. If the acceptance of a state that was not a
party to the Statute was required for a particular prosecution, provision was
made for that state to lodge a declaration giving its consent on an ad hoc
basis. Under this jurisdiction “a la carte” approach41, states would have been
able to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the ICC through special
declarations, specifically for certain or even individual crimes and/or for
certain periods of time.
The argument for using this strategy can be found in the ILC commentary to
the Draft Statute where it is explained that it would facilitate the acceptance
of the Statute as a whole.42 The opt-in regime would make the treaty
politically easier for states to ratify.43 Some states argued that the automatic
jurisdiction would infringe their national jurisdiction. They emphasised the
importance of voluntary acceptance of the jurisdiction since the Court’s
jurisdiction has implications for the national criminal jurisdiction, which is
an essential element of state sovereignty.44 At the negotiations of the
Preparatory Committee prior to the Rome Conference, it became clear that
states concerned with their sovereignty wanted a Court that would only be
able to act when the states concerned, or the UN Security Council, allowed
it to do so in specific cases.45  It was the participation of these states that the
ILC wanted to secure with the introduction of the opt-in regime in the Draft
Statute.
At the Rome Conference this approach was supported by a minority of 27
states, including India, China46, France, the USA47, and many Arab states.48
These states wanted some form of consent regime, either opting-in or
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opting-out or consent on individual cases, as opposed to automatic
jurisdiction. Some of these 27 states were however aiming at such a regime
either only for crimes against humanity and war crimes, or only for war
crimes.49 France argued for a state consent regime for war crimes and crimes
against humanity. France was concerned with the consequences for their
peacekeeping and enforcement missions. 50 The USA argued that automatic
jurisdiction, in connection with the alternative acceptance of jurisdiction51,
would enable the Court to exercise jurisdiction over a national of a non-state
party. They were worried that the US armed forces operating overseas would
be prosecuted by the ICC even if the USA had not agreed to be bound by the
Statute.52
4.1.3 Arguments against an “opt-out/opt-in” regime
The argument, previously mentioned, that one has to respect the principle of
state sovereignty in order to get as many states as possible to ratify the
Statute, seems to speak for an opt-out or opt-in regime. There are however
many arguments that speak against this ‘a la carte’ approach and instead
speak in favour of automatic jurisdiction. There was substantial criticism of
the opt-out/opt-in regime from various delegations at the negations of the
Pre Com53, and at the Rome Conference a majority of the states voted in
favour of the automatic jurisdiction.54 Among the states arguing against an
opt-in approach were Korea that stated that anything but automatic
jurisdiction would “deprive the Court of the predictability of its function by
granting states a de facto right of veto to determine whether the Court is able
to exercise jurisdiction.”55  The opt-in approach was also strongly criticised
by the NGO community. According to the Human Rights Watch the opt-in
approach and the requirement of state consent would seriously have
undermined the independence and credibility of the Court.56 They argued
that when individual states are allowed to select the crimes or types of
conduct over which they accept the Court’s jurisdiction, or worse, to chose
on a case by case basis, when to allow the Court to proceed and when not to,
the Court is open to political manipulation. The Court would be vulnerable
to illegitimate interests that recalcitrant states may have had in shielding
perpetrators.57 The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights were also of the
opinion that the ICC could not have operated as an independent and
effective international forum if the states had the right to pick and choose
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crimes over which they would grant jurisdiction. They argued that, without
automatic jurisdiction the Court would not have been able to perform its
primal task of dispensing justice where the national criminal justice system
is unavailable or ineffective58. The Court would never be able to “determine
whether a national system is available and effective because lack of consent
to its jurisdiction would prevent it from attempting such an assessment.”59
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights also stated that the different
jurisdiction regimes for genocide and the other core crimes, as proposed by
the ILC, was undesirable for practical reasons.60 The complete freedom of
the states would probably have led to chaos, with very different declarations
of submissions depending on whether states chose to be open or restrictive
towards the Court. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights did not
accept the argument that automatic jurisdiction presented an encroachment
on state sovereignty. They emphasised the fact that automatic jurisdiction
did not mean exclusive or primary jurisdiction and that, according to
principle of complementarily61, the Court will only be seized of a case when
a national procedure is unavailable or ineffective.62 Also the Human Rights
Watch argued that legitimate state interests, such as the prosecution of
crimes within its jurisdiction, are more than adequately protected by the
principle of complementarity and that an opt-in system, therefore, is not
necessary to see to these interests.63 64
4.1.4 Articles in the Rome Statute
The struggle for jurisdiction ended in a compromise and the Rome Statute
does now provide for automatic jurisdiction as the main rule. According to
Article 12, a state party accepts jurisdiction over the crimes referred to in
Article 5 upon ratification of the Statute. Article 120 strengthens this main
rule of no opt-out from the subject matter by stating that no reservations may
be made to the Statute. However, Article 124 contains a significant
exception to the rule of automatic jurisdiction when it comes to war crimes.
This transitional provision will allow state parties to opt out of the ICC’s
war crime jurisdiction for an initial period of seven years, when the crime
was committed in its territory or by its nationals. This article was introduced
as a compromise to obtain agreement from the states, with a record of active
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participation in international peacekeeping and enforcement operations,
which feared that their soldiers would be charged in front of the ICC for war
crimes.65 While this limited clause was considered adequate by France, that
voted for the compromise, the USA wanted a broader opt-out regime and
voted against the Statute.66 If states choose to opt out from the jurisdiction
for war crimes, this solution will create a de facto opt-out regime for war
crimes, which negates the concept of automatic jurisdiction of the Court.
4.2 Which states need to be parties or give their
consent?
4.2.1 General
A closely related, but separate question, is which states need to be parties to
the ICC treaty, or need to give their ad hoc consent to the proceedings, as a
precondition to the exercise of ICC jurisdiction. This question was the
subject of lengthy negotiations during the sessions of the Prep Com and at
the Rome Conference. There were many proposals, ranging from the
German one that no specific state would have to give its consent for the
Court to exercise jurisdiction, to the American proposal67 that required the
cumulative consent of both the territorial state and the state of nationality of
the alleged perpetrator. In between there were different proposals as to
which state that had to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court;
the state on the territory on which the crime had been committed, the state in
the custody of which the suspect was being held, the state of which a
national was a victim of the crime, the state of which a national was the
suspect, or different combinations of these states.68 One constellation that
attracted a great deal of interest at the Rome Conference, was the Korean
proposal69 that allowed the Court to exercise jurisdiction if one of four
alternative states were parties to the Statute or had given their consent on an
ad hoc basis. 70
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4.2.2 Arguments in favour of universal jurisdiction
The German proposal relied on the principle of “universal jurisdiction”.
Under this principle any state can prosecute the perpetrator of genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes, regardless of the nationality of the
offender, the nationality of the victim or the place were the crime was
committed.71 Germany argued that since the UN member states can exercise
universal jurisdiction nationally with regard to these three crimes, they
should also be able to transfer this universal jurisdiction to the ICC by
ratifying the Statute. If state parties can “individually exercise universal
jurisdiction, they can also vest the ICC with similar power. The ICC should
be put in the same situation as any state.”72  “By ratifying the Statute of the
ICC the state parties accept in an official and formal manner that the ICC
can also exercise criminal jurisdiction with regard to these core crimes.”73
This proposal was supported by various states74 and particularly by the
International Committee of the Red Cross. The ICRC delegation in Rome
stated that the universal jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity
and certain categories of war crimes is well established and meant that the
universal jurisdiction would in fact be weakened if the Court required
agreement of a state to have jurisdiction. They were of the opinion that it
would “make it difficult for the Court to function if additional conditions
were imposed.”75 The universal jurisdiction approach was also strongly
supported by other non-governmental organisations, above all Human
Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights and the ‘NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court’.  The
Human Rights Watch supported the view that the Court should have
jurisdiction over the core crimes on the basis of universal jurisdiction, and
be able to prosecute these crimes irrespectively of where and by whom they
were committed. “Any other position would result in an ICC, established
with the specific role of administering criminal justice when national
systems fail, having less jurisdictional ability to fulfil this mandate than any
one of the state parties that collectively created it.”76 Also Amnesty
International pointed at the fact that the Court would have less power than
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the states to bring the suspect to justice. They meant that this could lead to
absurd consequences77 that ran counter to the purpose of establishing an
international criminal court and might render it ineffective.78 The Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights stated that the ultimate effect of a retreat from
the universal jurisdiction would be to “curtail the court’s effectiveness as an
independent body for years to come, i.e. until the treaty is universally
ratified.” 79
4.2.3 Arguments against universal jurisdiction
The doctrine of universality was, as mentioned earlier, rejected by some
states at the Rome Conference. These states insisted that it should not be
given any recognition by the Statute and they argued that the jurisdiction of
the Court should be dependent on some sort of state consent instead.80 The
USA, in particular, spoke out very clearly against the German proposal and
strongly and repeatedly demanded that it was only the state of nationality of
the suspect that ought to be important.81 In order for jurisdiction to apply,
this country would have to be a party to the Statute or have agreed on the
procedure.82 In its statement of July 9 1998 the US delegation expressed its
fear of the Court’s ability to target citizens of non-state parties. The United
states expressed the view that if universal jurisdiction, or some variant of it,
was embodied in the Statute, the Statute would have few participants. They
argued that the principle of universal jurisdiction “is not a principle accepted
in the practice of most governments of the world and, if adopted in this
Statute, would erode fundamental principles of treaty law that every
government […] support”83
4.2.4 Articles in the Rome Statute
The option finally adopted represents a compromise, seeking to achieve
balance between those who wanted a broad inclusive test, based on universal
jurisdiction, and those who wanted a restrictive test, such as the mandatory
acceptance of the state of nationality in all cases. Article 12(2) of the Rome
Statute states that either the state “on the territory of which the conduct in
question occurred” or the state ”of which the person accused of the crime is
a national” must have become a party to the Statute or accepted the Court’s
jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis. The text is distinguished from the US
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proposal in that it requires the consent of either the territorial state, or the
state of nationality of the accused, whereas the US proposal had required the
consent of both states. It also differs from the Korean proposal by requiring
one of two, instead of one of four, states to be party to the Statute of the
Court, or to accept the jurisdiction of the Court. If either the state of
nationality of the accused, or the territorial state is party to the Statute or has
consented the jurisdiction, the Court may exercise jurisdiction. It also clearly
differs from the German proposal, under which no state would have to
subject itself to the Court’s jurisdiction. When the case has been referred to
the Court by the Security Council, neither the state in whose territory crimes
have been committed nor the state of nationality of the accused has to be a
party to the Statute in order for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction. This is
because referral of a situation by the Security Council is based on the
competence under Chapter VII of the UN-Charter, which is binding and
legally enforceable in all states.84
4.3 Issues of admissibility
4.3.1 Principle of Complementarity
The issue of admissibility is closely connected with the complementary
character of the Court. The principle of complementarity85, governing the
relationship between national jurisdiction and the Court, is one of the key
principles of the ICC Statute. In cases of concurrent jurisdiction between
national courts and the ICC, the former have priority. The Court is not
intended to be a supranational institution replacing national courts, but to
operate when national courts are unable or unwilling to operate.86 An
essential element of the rationale of the complementarity principle is that
national authorities shall be given a chance to enforce international
humanitarian law and international human rights law in accordance with
their international legal obligations. The primary responsibility of enforcing
human rights always lies on the states. It is only when the national systems
are not able to do so that the international community has to act, in this case
the ICC has to investigate and prosecute. For the Court to be as effective as
possible the rules have to ensure that it is the primary duty of the state to
bring those responsible for grave crimes under international law to justice,
but the Court must be able to act as an effective complement to the states
which are unable or unwilling to fulfil this duty.
The rules have to balance the conflicting vision from the states that were
reluctant to create a body that could impinge national sovereignty, and
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therefore wanted a Court that could only assume jurisdiction where the
national system is unable to investigate and prosecute, and other states and
non-governmental organisations that held that the Court should have the
potential for a greater role. The states supporting the latter view feared the
possibility of sham investigations or trials aimed at protecting perpetrators
and argued that the Court should intervene when proceedings under the
national jurisdiction were ineffective and when a national juridical system
was unavailable.87 Most human rights groups supported the latter view. The
Human Rights Watch argued that it was the primal responsibility of the
states to prosecute, but that an unqualified deference to state claims of
jurisdiction, without appropriate ICC review, would jeopardise the prospect
of justice.88
 4.3.2 Articles in the Rome Statute
The primacy of national jurisdictions is assured by the rules of admissibility
laid down in Article 17 of the Statute. The Article identifies four grounds on
which the ICC shall determine that a case is inadmissible. First, that the case
is being investigated or prosecuted by a state which has jurisdiction over it,
unless the state is “unwilling or unable genuinely” to investigate and
prosecute. Second, that the case has been investigated by a state which has
jurisdiction over it and the state has decided not to prosecute the person
concerned, unless such a decision resulted from the “unwillingness or
inability of the state genuinely to prosecute.” Third that the person
concerned has already been tried for the conduct in question and a trial by
the ICC is not permitted under the rule of ne bis in idem89. Fourth, that the
case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court. The
first three grounds are subject to specific limitations; that the state is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out investigations or prosecution90,
that the national prosecution was conducted for the purpose of shielding the
person concerned from criminal responsibility within the ICC jurisdiction91,
or that the national prosecution was not conducted independently or
impartially in accordance with the norms of due process recognised by
international law and lacked a meaningful intent to bring the person to
justice92. The burden of proof lies on the Prosecutor and Article 17(2)
provides guidelines for the Court on how to determine the “unwillingness”
of a state. The Court must in essence consider whether the domestic
prosecution has been undertaken for the purpose of shielding the accused
from criminal responsibility. The Prosecutor must show that there is a
“devious intent contrary to its apparent actions”. 93 The Court will have to
consider whether there has been undue delay in the state-initiated
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prosecution, indicative of a lack of genuine intention to proceed, or whether
the domestic case is conducted independently and impartially, consistent
with expressed intention to bring the person to justice.94 The test of the
“willingness” is in effect a test of the good faith of the national authorities.
As to determining the inability of a state to prosecute, the guidelines are laid
down in article 17(3), and the Court is required to examine whether the state
is unable to obtain the accused, or the evidence, or otherwise to carry out the
proceedings, due to a total or partial collapse of its national juridical system.
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5 Exercise of Jurisdiction/
Trigger Mechanisms
5.1 General
Another factor that is of importance for the credibility, independence and
effectiveness of the Court, is what mechanisms there are available to trigger
the Courts jurisdiction; in other words, what organs that can initiate
proceedings. In order for the ICC to be an effective complement to the
national courts, the trigger mechanisms should be constructed so that the
Court is able to exercise its jurisdiction in any case falling within its
jurisdiction when states are unable or unwilling to bring to justice those
responsible for the core crimes. The Court should not be prevented from
fulfilling its mandate because only a limited number of the cases are brought
to the attention of the Prosecutor. To be effective the ICC must also be
impartial and independent judicial body guided by legal rather then a
political process. The cases that are investigated and prosecuted should be
chosen on neutral, non-political criteria.95 The impartiality of the Court is of
vital importance for the credibility of the Court. The Special Rapporteur on
torture, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, stated that “if such indictments were left to the
decision of a political body […] this could but call into question the
impartiality of international justice.”96
The Statute provides that proceedings may be initiated by three distinct
entities. According to Article 13 of the Statute, a situation, in which one or
more of the crimes contained in Article 5 appears to have been committed,
can be referred to the Prosecutor by a state party, or by the Security Council
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the Prosecutor may initiate
proprio motu an investigation. I will present these three different trigger
mechanisms separately to see if they ensure the effectiveness, credibility and
independence of the Court.
5.2 State party
A state party to the Statute may refer a “situation” to the Prosecutor who
evaluates the information and determines whether there are sufficient
grounds for initiating an investigation.97 Referrals by state parties were not
particularly controversial during the negotiations of the Statute.98 Most
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delegations agreed that state parties should have this power. The relevant
questions concerning state complaints, that were discussed at the Rome
Conference were which states would have the right to lodge a complaint and
how to avoid undue political pressure on the Court.
The ILC Draft Statute provided that a complaint may be lodged only by a
state party that had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, in respect of the
crime which was the subject of the complaint or, in the case of genocide,
was a party to the Genocide Convention.99 There was also a proposal at the
Rome Conference that only states with an interest in a particular case should
have the right to file a complaint.100 These requirements were however seen
to be too strict by many delegates at the Rome Conference and by human
rights organisations. They argued that all state parties should have the right
to bring a complaint since the crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction are
crimes under customary international law and all states are interested in
repressing the violation of these crimes.101 In accordance with the principle
of automatic jurisdiction the final Statute provides that all state parties can
lodge complaints alleging that one of the three core crimes has been
committed.
Another question discussed at the Conference was how to ensure that the
states do not put undue political pressure on the Prosecutor to initiate
investigations or prosecution in a particular case. In its recommendations to
the Conference, Amnesty International addressed the concern that state
complaints could be brought for political reasons against suspects only from
unpopular states or against only certain people suspected of a particular
crime.102 To minimise prejudicing the Court by naming individuals, the
original proposal was modified so that states are allowed only to refer a
“situation”, rather then an individual “case”, to the Court. The Prosecutor
then has the power to determine if there is sufficient evidence to indict an
individual for a particular crime arising out of the situation that has been
referred.
There were also concerns among many delegations that state complaints
would not be a very effective trigger mechanism.103Amnesty International
stated that there is a risk that “few states would bring complaints against
nationals of other states because such complaints might be viewed as
infringing the sovereignty of those states or as interfering with diplomatic
relations with those states”.104 State complaints have not been a particularly
effective means of enforcing human rights obligations while not many states
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have used the state complaints procedure in the human rights treaties105. No
state has used the state complaint in Article 41 of the ICCPR106, Article 21
of the Convention against Torture107, Article 45 and 61 of the American
Convention on Human Rights108, or Article 47 of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights109. The procedure was nevertheless included in
the Statute since it was seen to remain a useful complement to powers of the
Security Council and the Prosecutor.
5.3 Security Council
According to Article 13(b), the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII
of the UN-Charter, may refer a situation to the Prosecutor. The question of
Security Council referral will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 8. In
this section I will only mention the most important issues in the negotiating
process.
The question of Security Council referrals was more controversial during the
negotiations than state party referrals. The states in favour of giving the
Council this power to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction argued that it would
remove the need for the Council to create ad hoc tribunals.110 Another
argument in favour was that it would provide political support for the
prosecution. “By referring a situation, the Security Council would shoulder
part of the political pressure of pursuing sensitive investigations and
prosecutions springing from that referral.”111 The Council would be
signalling it’s political support and a subsequent indictment would carry
more political weight than would an indictment resulting from a situation
referred merely by one or more states. A third positive factor is that such a
referral by the Council would do away with the requirement in Article 12.
Since the referral of a situation by the Security Council is based on its
competence under Chapter VII, which is binding and legally enforceable in
all states, the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction is part of the Council’s
authority under international law. As such, jurisdiction is binding on all the
states concerned even when neither the state in whose territory crimes have
been committed, nor the state of nationality of the accused is a Party to the
Statute. In other words, in cases of referral by the Security Council, the
Court will be able to exercise its jurisdiction irrespective of whether or not
the states concerned are parties to the Statute.112
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The states that argued against giving a power of referral to the Council
meant that such a role would reduce the credibility and moral authority of
the Court, undermine it's independence and impartiality and open the
possibility for exerting political influence on the Court.113 Some felt that
such a provision was inequitable in that this specific trigger would only be
used against states other than the permanent members of the Council since
the latter could use their power of veto to prevent referrals which impinged
on their interests.114
5.4 Prosecutor
Under the ILC Draft Statute, only state parties and the Security Council
would be able to initiate proceedings before the Court.115 The Prosecutor
would have no authority to target a situation on his or her own initiative and
to ex officio initiate an investigation. A number of delegations expressed the
concerns that the role of the Prosecutor under the ILC Draft was too
restrictive and they put forward suggestions that would grant the Prosecutor
the power to initiate proceedings on his or her own motion on the basis of
information provided, not only by Governments or the Security Council, but
also by other sources, including individuals and non-governmental
organisations.116 These delegations argued that an independent prosecutor
would be useful in situations where, for political reasons, neither the
Security Council, nor state parties, refer a situation to the ICC, “even though
it may be manifestly clear to the international community that an
investigation is warranted”.117 Many states also believed that the proprio
motu role of the Prosecutor was the key feature to an effective criminal court
and that it was essential to grant the Prosecutor ex officio powers for
triggering the jurisdiction of the Court, provided that those powers would be
subject to certain safeguards.118 They meant that an expanded role for the
Prosecutor would enhance not only his or her autonomy and independence,
but also the independence and the credibility of the Court as a whole, which
would be able to function on behalf of the international community rather
than on behalf of particular complaints by a state or by the Security Council.
Non-governmental organisations saw the independence of the Prosecutor as
an essential feature of an independent, credible Court and they led a strong
campaign in favour of conferring proprio motu powers to the Prosecutor.
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights argued that the Court’s ultimate
independence and effectiveness would hinge on whether the ICC Prosecutor
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had the authority to initiate investigations proprio motu, rather than having
to depend on Security Council or state party referrals. They were concerned
that state parties and the Security Council would not always have the
information, resources and political will to monitor and react to cases of
serious human rights abuses. They thought that this would be particularly
true for cases in countries outside the political and media spotlights.119 Also
Amnesty International emphasised the inadequacy of state complaints and
Security Council referrals as sole trigger mechanisms. They stated that the
Security Council could be paralysed by the veto by the permanent members,
and that states historically are known not to make use of the inter-state
complaint mechanisms120, and that these methods therefore would lead to
only a limited number of cases being investigated or prosecuted. They
concluded that if these two methods were not supplemented by independent
investigations and prosecutions by the Prosecutor, the Court could be
crippled at birth.121  The Human Rights Watch stressed the importance of
the fact that the Prosecutor could base its investigations on information from
victims. They also expressed concern of the risk that, if only states and the
Security Council could trigger prosecutorial investigations, “only
individuals or nationals of states that have fallen out of favour will be
prosecuted”, since the proper functioning of the Court then would be
dependent on the political motivations of these entities.122
Some participating states of the Rome Conference strongly objected to this
power of the Prosecutor on the ground that the Prosecutor might be
overwhelmed with frivolous complaints and would have to waste limited
resources to attend to them. They were also concerned with the risk of
politisation of the Court, but came to exactly the opposite conclusion than
the parties in favour of an independent Prosecutor, on how to insulate the
Court from this risk. They argued that the “Prosecutor might be politically
pressured to bring a complaint even if it were not justifiable or helpful in a
particular political context”123, and therefore opposed to granting the
Prosecutor this authority. The United States delegation expressed concern
for the “considerable political pressure that organisations will bring to bear
on the Prosecutor in advocating that he or she takes on the causes which
they champion.”124 A few participants argued that the Prosecutor would
need the firm political backing that could only come from the Security
Council or a state party referral.125
Article 15 of the Statute provides that the Prosecutor may initiate
investigations proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the
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jurisdiction of the Court. The Prosecutor shall analyse the seriousness of the
information received and may, to this end, “seek additional information
from states, organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental or non-
governmental organisations, or other reliable sources that he or she deems
appropriate, and receive written or oral testimony at the seat of the
Court.”126 The Prosecutor is however subject to checks and balances, in
order to prevent frivolous prosecutions. The proprio motu power of the
Prosecutor is coupled with a decision by a pre-trial chamber to authorise
such investigation. Once the prosecutor “concludes that there is a reasonable
basis to proceed with an investigation, he shall submit to the pre-trial
chamber a request for authorisation of an investigation.”127 Further “if the
pre-trial chamber considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with
an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of
the Court, it shall authorise the commencement of the investigation.”128  The
Prosecutor has a right to initiate, and not actually start, investigations.
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6 The United Nations Security
Council
6.1 General
The remaining parts of this thesis will be devoted to the question of what
relationship the ICC and the UN Security Council will come to have in the
future. Before going deeper into this question it is important to note the
relevance of Article 103 of the UN Charter129 in this context. This Article
states that all obligations under the UN Charter supersede all other treaty
obligations. Since the ICC is a treaty bases institution, the negotiators in
Rome were bound by the powers given to the Security Council in the UN
Charter. It was not open to the Rome Conference, or to the Statute as a legal
instrument, to confer new powers on the Security Council, or indeed control
the exercise of its existing powers. It is therefore of great importance to
assess what powers the Council has been given according to the Charter,
before I can scrutinise the negotiations in Rome and the future relationship
between the ICC and the UN Security Council. In this chapter I will
therefore take a close look at the powers of the Security Council. Only after
this chapter will it be interesting to look from the ICC perspective on how to
solve the problem of Council interference, or how to take advantage of
Council co-operation.
Before looking at the Council’s powers, some basic facts about the
composition of the Council, its voting procedure and its main duties will
however be given. The examination of the Council’s powers will begin with
a description of the specific powers it has been given under the UN Charter.
I will then turn to the fact that the UN Charter has been interpreted as to give
the Council broader powers than the actual letter of the Charter suggest. I
will also state what legal and political limitations that exist to the powers.
To give the full picture of the Councils powers, the final part will give
examples of how the Council has used its powers in practise. The
knowledge from the earlier parts of this chapter will be applied, as to see
how the powers have been broadened by implied powers, and limited by
political and legal limitations. In doing this I will see how the powers have
evolved since the drafting of the UN Charter and up till now. Only by
looking into the past, how the Council has worked and interpreted its powers
before, can I try to get a picture of how it can come to work in the future.
This will be of great importance in order to understand what role it can come
to play in relation to the ICC in the future.
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6.2 Composition of the Security Council
The Security Council is one of the six principal organs of the UN. It consists
of fifteen member states, of which China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom and the United States are permanent members. The other ten
members are non-permanent, elected for two years by the General
Assembly. In their election due regard is to be specially paid, in the first
instance, to the contribution of members of the UN to the maintenance of
peace and security and to the other purposes of the organisation, and also to
equitable geographical distribution.130 The current practise is that five of the
non-permanent places are filled by African and Asian states, two by Latin
American states, one by an Eastern European state and two by Western
European and other states.131
6.3 Voting procedure in the Security Council
Due to the specific voting procedure, the five permanent members have a
very strong position in the Security Council. The procedure is outlined in
Article 27 and confirms the so-called veto power. The first paragraph of the
Article states that each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
Paragraph 2 says that “decisions of the Security Council on procedural
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members”, and
paragraph 3 provides that “decisions of the Security Council on all other
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members, including the
concurring votes of the five permanent members.” It is in this third
paragraph that the veto operates, as if a permanent member does not vote in
favour of a particular decision, that decision is blocked or “vetoed”, and fails
to legally come into existence.132
According to the wording of Article 27(3), the validity of a non-procedural
decision of the Council requires the affirmative votes of all five permanent
members. Therefore, even the mere abstention of a permanent member is to
be considered a veto and is able to paralyse the Council’s activity in a
particular case. Despite the clear words of Article 27(3) UN practise has,
since its early years, tended to acknowledge the validity of decisions made
with the abstention of one or more permanent members.133
After having established that non-procedural decisions of the Security
Council are to be taken by an affirmative vote of nine members and having
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attributed the right of the veto to the permanent members, Article 27(3),
adds that a member state of the Council, which is party to a dispute, shall
abstain from voting in the decision under Chapter VI and under Article
52(3).  The latter Article is concerned with a rather specific case, namely,
the relations between the Security Council and international organisations of
a regional character. Chapter VI is much more important since it, as we shall
see, authorises the Council to investigate disputes likely to endanger the
peace, to recommend the parties to such disputes to seek settlement by
peaceful means, and to deal itself with the merits of a dispute in order to
indicate a solution. Decisions under Chapter VII are however excluded from
the application of this nemo judex in re sua principle. This means that when
the Council is about to take a resolution concerning action in the event of
threat or breach of the peace, and of act of aggression the party to the dispute
does not have to abstain from voting and can make full use of its veto
power. In these cases it is therefore impossible for the Council to take action
against a permanent member. I will return to this problem under 6.6.2,
where I will present the veto as a political limitation on the Councils
powers.
6.4 Duties of the Security Council
Article 24(1) confers the primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security on the Security Council.134 It reads:
”In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying
out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their
behalf.”
With this phrasing of Article 24(1), the intentions of the authors of the UN-
Charter are expressly emphasised. Charging the Security Council with the
primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace is intended ”to ensure
prompt and effective action by the UN”.135 The Council, being a smaller
executive body with a permanent core of membership of the Great Powers,
continuously functioning, being able to assemble on short notice, was seen
as the body best able to take efficient decisions and intervene with
enforcement measures. Although the Security Council has primary
responsibility for maintaining peace and security, this responsibility is not
exclusive. Limited powers have been given to other UN-organs. The
General Assembly, for example, has powers of discussion and
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recommendation in regard to the subject. The priority of the Security
Council in this field is however underlined in Article 12, which states that
“[w]hile the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or
situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General
Assembly shall not make any recommendations with regard to that dispute
or situation unless the Security Council so requests.” The UN member states
have also kept some of the responsibility. The division of responsibility
between the Security Council and the states involved in a conflict is treated
differently by the Charter depending on how serious the conflict is. The
more serious a conflict is the more powers are given to the Council. What
powers the Council has in different situations will be discussed in the
following.
6.5 Powers of the Security Council
6.5.1 Specific Powers
6.5.1.1 General
The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of the
duty of maintaining the peace, are the powers that are specifically mentioned
in the UN Charter. According to Article 24(2) these powers are laid down in
Chapters VI, VII, VIII, XII of the Charter. Chapter VI concerns disputes or
situation which are “likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security”136 and the pacific settlements of these. In these types of
conflicts or situations, which only potentially could disturb the peace, the
parties to the dispute, or the states involved in a situation keep the first hand
responsibility of seeking a peaceful solution.137 The powers of the Council
under this Chapter are restricted to supporting the parties to a dispute in their
endeavours to settle their disputes through appropriate measures. Chapter
VII regulates the Council’s “action” for the maintenance of peace. The
Chapter concerns international crises that are underway, and not only
potentially could disturb the peace. In these cases the main role belongs to
the Security Council. The Council can decide to make recommendations or
decide what enforcement measures are to be taken to maintain or restore the
peace138, and it may call on the parties involved to comply with provisional
measures.139 There are two kinds of enforcement action that can be decided
by the Security Council: measures involving and measures not involving the
use of force.140 Chapter VIII, that deals with regional arrangements for
managing international peace and security, and Chapter XII, on the
international trusteeship system, are not relevant for this thesis and will
therefore be left aside.
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6.5.1.2 Binding power of Security Council decisions
Before going into Chapter VI and VII in detail, it is worth to mention a few
words about the binding power of the Security Council’s decisions.
According to Article 25 of the Charter, the Council has the power to take
decisions which the member states are obliged to abide by and carry out.
This is a direct consequence of the fact that the states have conferred the
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security under Article 24.141 It has often been suggested that Article 25 only
declare decisions taken under Chapter VII to be binding. 142 When acting
under Chapter VI the Security Council is generally confined to measures of
non-coercive nature which possesses no legally binding character for the
parties to the dispute.143 The word “recommendations” is used instead of
“decision”, and it was made clear at the Conference establishing the UN that
such recommendations have no binding force.144 When the Council is
exercising its authority under Chapter VII, on the other hand, it can make
decisions that the members are obligated to accept and carry out.
This is however a simplified view. In fact, the binding nature of resolutions
can not be determined by whether they have been taken under Chapter VI or
Chapter VII. 145  The binding nature of resolutions is instead to be decided
by whether they are intended to bind all member states or not. There is
therefore room for arguments that there are decisions that the Council may
take in the field of pacific settlement, and there have been suggestions that
the Council has the power to impose mandatory settlement by a combination
of Article 25 and Chapter VI.146 It is also clear that the resolutions taken
under Chapter VII do not always have to bind the members, but can be
merely recommendatory. The question of the possibility to make binding
decisions and non-binding recommendations under an Article will be
discussed in the end of each following section.
6.5.1.3 Specific powers under Chapter VI
 6.5.1.3.1 Supervision of the obligation to settle peacefully
As mentioned earlier, the responsibility to settle disputes, “likely to
endanger the maintenance of peace and security”, under Chapter VI, remains
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with the parties to the dispute. Article 33(1), which opens Chapter VI,
obligates the states parties to a dispute to seek a solution by peaceful means,
and indicates, by way of example, negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and resort to regional agencies
or arrangements.147 Article 33(2), on the other hand, sets forth one of the
Council’s powers. It states that “the Security Council shall, when it deems
necessary, call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such means” as
contained in paragraph (1). Of all possible responses to a dispute on its
agenda, Article 33(2) defines the one which least effect the sovereignty of
the states concerned. By appealing to the parties to do what they in any event
are bound to do, the Security Council refers responsibility back to them.
When acting under Article 33(2) the Council refrains from taking a stand on
the substance of the matter. Its role is merely one of supervision of the
obligation to settle placed on states. The effective use of this power can act
as a reminder to states of their duties under the Charter, but also as a
warning of future Council action under the other provisions of Chapter VI or
of Chapter VII.148 In principle such an appeal to the states is merely
recommendatory, and does not have a binding effect.149
6.5.1.3.2 Investigation
Article 34 provides that “the Security Council may investigate any dispute
or any situation in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute
or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security”. Article 34 does not provide for a general competence for the
Security Council to investigate. According to the wording of the Article the
Council is only competent to investigate the specific matters, disputes and
situations, for the specific purpose of determining if they are likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Given this
wording one can conclude that “the powers are confined to ascertaining
whether the dispute or situation come within the parameters of Chapter
VI”150, in other words, that the aim of the investigation must be to decide
whether or not to exercise the conciliation function under this Chapter. As
we shall see under 6.7.3.1.2 the provision has however been interpreted in a
broader sense, as attributing a general and all-encompassing power of
investigation. A decision made under Article 34 has a binding effect under
Article 25, although the Article is placed in Chapter VI.151 When a decision
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is made on the basis of Article 34, the states concerned are therefore under a
legal obligation to carry out this decision.152
6.5.1.3.3 The settlement of disputes
Article 36(1) of the Charter states that “the Security Council may, at any
stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of
like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.”
The Council may intervene at any point, without waiting for a prior attempt
by the parties to settle the dispute in the sense of Article 33(1).153 The
difference between Article 36 and Article 33(2) is that according to the
former the Security Council may recommend specific means of dispute
settlement, whereas according to the latter it may only call upon the parties
to settle the dispute peacefully, thus simply reinforcing their obligation
under Article 33(1). While Article 33(1) refers to a general request by the
Council, Article 36 provides that the Council may indicate what specific
means that are appropriate for a given question. The Council may
recommend a procedure or method found in Article 33(1), or other means of
a similar nature.154 The Security Council can give a recommendation of the
procedure or method to follow or it can itself provide for such a procedure
or method. The Council does not, however, have the power to make
recommendations on the merits of the question.155
Article 37 provides the Council with the power to recommend solutions on
the merits. Under this Article the Council can recommended “terms to
settle”, that is, suggesting to the states how to settle a given dispute.
According to the wording of the Article, this power can only be exercised in
the presence of special and more rigid conditions. First of all Article 37(1)
presupposes a dispute in the sense of Article 33(1), that is a dispute likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.  A second pre-
condition is that the dispute has to be referred to the Security Council by at
least one state party to the dispute. Paragraph 1 of the Article puts an
obligation on the states to refer the dispute to the Council when they are not
able to settle the dispute by means indicated in Article 33(1). This obligation
only arises when the possibility of an agreement between the parties proves
to be unrealisable.156 It is for the parties to a dispute alone to decide whether
settlement has failed.157
Article 38 provides that the Council “may, if all the parties to any dispute so
request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific
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settlement of the dispute”. Unlike Article 34, 36 and 37, it does not refer to
Article 33 and the definition of a dispute found there. From this the
conclusion can be drawn that there are no specific requirements as to the
dispute itself under this provision; in particular it is not necessary that the
continuance of a dispute is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security.158 The consequence of this is that the
peaceful settlement function may also have as its subject disputes159 that do
not endanger the peace, provided that all the parties agree in bringing the
matter before the Council. The fact that the dispute does not have to cross
the threshold in Article 33 does not mean that the parties can not refer
disputes that fall under the definition. On the contrary, Article 38 also
extends to those disputes that the states are obliged to settle peacefully under
Article 33. By means of this provision the Council can therefore, at the
parties’ request, involve itself in any kind of dispute as a mediator or
conciliator.
Recommendations made by the Council under Articles 36, 37 and 38 do not
bind states to follow the recommended course of conduct. This follows from
the word ‘recommendation’ rather than the word ‘decision’, and from the
drafting history of the Articles.160 161
6.5.1.3.4 Reference to the International Court of Justice
Article 36(3) states that “in making recommendations under [Article 36] the
Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes
should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court
of Justice.” This provision is not an extension of the Councils powers but,
on the contrary, limits its discretion when making a decision. The Security
Council is not prevented from dealing with a dispute even if this dispute is
already pending before the ICJ. Neither the fact that the dispute is pending,
nor a provision like Article 12(1) of the UN Charter162 contradict this result.
Parallel actions by the Security Council and the ICJ are therefore generally
considered to be acceptable in order to achieve a settlement of the dispute by
simultaneous legal and political decisions.163 164
                                                
158 N. Bentwich/A. Martin, A Commentary on the Charter, 1951, p.86
159 Note that Article 38 does not apply to situations. This follows from the wording of the
provision as such and from the fact that Article 38 is among the classic means of dispute
settlement. See T. Stein/S. Richter, Article 38, In: B. Simma, p.562
160 Stein/Richter, Article 36, In: B. Simma, 1994, p.546, Stein/Richter, Article 37, In: B.
Simma, 1994, p 560,  Stein/Richter, Article 38, In: B. Simma, 1994, p. 564
161 Although the provisions do not allow for the Council to impose a mandatory settlement,
it is able to use a combination of powers under Chapter VI and VII to the same effect if it
determines that the situation or conflict is a threat to or breach of the peace. See N. D.
White, 1993, p.84
162 See 6.4 for the meaning of this Article
163 T. Stein/S. Richter, Article 36, In: B. Simma, 1994, p.545
164 Compare with the Council’s relationship with the ICC, in which the Council can defer
proceedings when they impede the Council’s work in the field of international peace and
security. See chapter 9.
36
A recommendation does not in itself establish the jurisdiction of the ICJ.
This follows from the fact that the recommendations of the Security Council
under Article 36 are not binding, and that Article 36(3) does not extend the
powers of the Security Council, but on the contrary, limits its discretion
when making a decision. The Council can only recommend, but not oblige,
states to submit their disputes to judicial settlement.165 166
6.5.1.4 Specific powers under Chapter VII
6.5.1.4.1 Recommendations under Article 39
Article 39 is of great interest since it is the key to the powers laid down in
Chapter VII. Through this Article the Security Council is empowered to
determine the existence of a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression”, and only when these prerequisites are met can the Council
proceed to the measures in the Chapter. This power of the Council to make
an Article 39 determination will not be discussed here, but under 6.7.2.2. In
this section I will instead examine the Council’s power to make
recommendations under the Article. According to Article 39, the Security
Council can make recommendations for the maintenance or restoration of
international peace and security. As can be clearly deduced from the
preparatory works, these recommendations may be identical to the
recommendations under Chapter VI.167 In other words, the intention in
Article 39 is to confirm that, also in situations coming under Chapter VII,
the Council may exercise its peaceful settlement function, indicating to the
states concerned procedures and methods of settlement, or terms of
settlement. The difference between the peaceful settlement function in
Chapter VI and the one under Article 39 is procedural, in that only in the
first case does the obligation exist that a directly concerned Council member
must abstain to vote.168 Within the framework of Article 39,
recommendations can be a preliminary stage for further measures, in
particular enforcement measures under article 41 and 42. According to the
wording of the provision, the Council can however not recommend the
enforcement measures laid down in these Articles. Article 39 makes a clear
distinction between the non-binding recommendations on the one hand and
decisions on measures under Articles 41 and 42 on the other.169
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6.5.1.4.2 Provisional measures
Article 40 gives the Council the power to call upon the parties concerned to
comply with provisional measures, as it deems desirable. The object of the
measures should be to prevent an aggravation of the situation. The
provisional measures are meant to be emergency measures preliminary to
any other resolution adopted on the basis of Chapter VII.170 The drafters of
the Charter inserted the provisional measures provision as an optional
stopgap before the application of enforcement measures under article 40 and
41.171 In order to take provisional measures the Council still has to
determine that there, at least, exists a threat to the peace in the sense of
Article 39.172 The second sentence of the Article states that “such
provisional measures shall be without prejudice, to the right, claim or
positions of the parties concerned.”  The measures may only have
provisional character and leave unaffected the legal position of the states
concerned, particularly of any parties to the conflict. The Article is
specifically intended to give the Security Council an opportunity for
intervening to end hostilities before deciding, for example, who the
aggressor is.173 It is not clearly stated in Article 40 that the provisional
measures have a binding effect. It is however largely assumed in literature
that the Council could make both binding decision and mere
recommendations under the Article.174
6.5.1.4.3 Measures not involving the use of force
Article 41 is the legal basis for non-military enforcement measures. The
powers contained in this Article are intended to allow for the imposition of
mandatory enforcement measures following a finding of a threat or a breach
of the peace, under article 39. In the second sentence of the Article examples
of such measures are given. The most important of these boycott measures is
the complete or partial interruption of economical relations. Other measures
mentioned in the article are “complete or partial interruption of rail, sea, air
postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations.” Besides these typical measures
mentioned in the Article itself, the Article has been interpreted as to give the
Council the power to impose other measure whose purpose are to provide a
sanction and which does not involve the use of armed force. These
“atypical” measures will be discussed in 6.7.3.2.3.
The first sentence of the Article states that the Council can decide what
measures to employ and that it may call upon the members of the United
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Nations to apply such measures. The measures under Article 41 are not
carried out by the Council itself, but adopted by the member states of the
UN at the request of the Council. Under Article 48 the member states are
under an obligation to carry out the Councils decisions and to implement the
measures decided upon. The states are thus obliged by the UN-Charter to
carry out decisions regarding measures not involving the use of force. The
Council is however free, when it does not want to make binding decisions,
to only recommend measures under Article 41.175 The states are then free to
adopt the measures or not.
6.5.1.4.4 Measures involving the use of force
Article 42 and the following articles concern the Security Council’s power
to use force against a state responsible for aggression, or responsible for a
threat to the peace or breach of the peace. Article 42 states that the Council
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces, as it deems necessary to
maintain and restore international peace and security. The Article does not
only contemplate operations involving combat against armed forces, but also
demonstrations and blockades are expressly mentioned. A prerequisite to the
application of article 42 is the opinion of the Council that measures provided
for in Article 41 would be inadequate or that they have proven to be
inadequate. It is not necessary that measures have previously been ordered
and implemented under Article 41. Rather, it is sufficient that the Council
opts immediately for Article 42 on the basis of a prognosis of the possible
ineffectiveness of the procedures of measures under Article 41. 176
According to Article 42 action may be decided upon and implemented by
the Security Council itself. The Council does not have to order or
recommend something to the states, but acts directly. This presupposes that
armed forces are made available to it by the member states. Article 43
contains the relevant regulations for this purpose and details the mechanism
whereby armed forces are to be made available. The member states are
obliged to enter into “special agreements” with the Council and to place
troops at the disposal of the Council.177 Under Articles 46 and 47, the actual
use of the various national contingents is to be decided by a Military Staff
Committee, composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members,
and under the authority of the Council. As we shall se under 6.7.3.2.4,
Articles 43 and following articles have never, from 1945 until today, been
applied.
6.5.2 Implied powers
The powers of the Security Council are not limited to these specifically
expressed powers mentioned in Articles 24(2) and elaborated in Chapter VI,
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VII, VIII and XII. The UN Charter has been interpreted to mean that the
Council, in addition to these ‘specific’ powers granted, has ‘general’
powers, not expressly mentioned in the Charter, but necessary for the proper
discharge of its functions.178 179 The doctrine of implied powers was
expressed by the International Court of Justice in the Reparation case of
1949180, where it stated that “the rights and duties of an entity such as the
Organisation must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or
implied in its constituent documents and developed in practise.” 181 In the
Namibia Advisory Opinion from 1971182, the International Court of Justice
commented on the powers of the Security Council, and stated that “[t]he
reference in paragraph 2 of this Article [Article 24] to specific powers of the
Security Council under certain chapters of the Charter does not exclude the
existence of general powers to discharge the responsibilities conferred to it
in paragraph 1.” The ICJ referred to an earlier statement of the Secretary-
General in 1947 that the Council’s powers are not restricted to those
specifically referred to in paragraph 2, but are “commensurate with its
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.”183 A restrictive
interpretation of 24(2), in the sense of a final listing of the powers conferred
on the Council, is not compatible with the fact that the Council is charged
with the primary responsibility for maintenance of peace and security. For,
“if the Security Council, as the primarily responsible political organ, is to
live up to its mandate to take prompt and effective measures for the
maintenance of peace, it must be accorded the widest possible discretion as
to the kind of measures to be taken.”184 Article 24 therefore serves as the
basis for comprehensive powers for the Council, going beyond the
enumeration in paragraph 2 and thereby fulfilling the function of closing any
gaps in the provisions of powers for the Council which might otherwise
exist. Where the Charter leaves gaps in providing for specific authority for
the Council to take measures necessary to carry out its primary function of
maintaining the peace, it may be presumed to have those powers necessary
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to prevent the frustration of one of the fundamental objects or purposes of
the Charter.185 However, given the fact that the range of powers of the
Security Council is open in principle, the discretion of the Council in taking
action is not completely unlimited. The only express limitations are that the
powers must be exercised in conformity with the fundamental purposes and
principles found in Chapter I of the Charter. There are however other,
political, limitations to the Council’s power that will be discussed in the
following Chapter. In 6.7 I will examine how the Council has used its,
specific and implied, powers.
6.6 Limitations on the powers of the Security
Council
6.6.1 Legal limitations
In discharging its duties, the Security Council shall, according to Article
24(2), act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN. These
are the only express limits to the power of the Council under the Charter.
The purposes and principles of the UN are laid down in Article 1 and 2.
They are extremely broad in scope and are defined in very wide terms. I will
in the following present the purposes and principles that are of interest for
the scope of this thesis.
Paragraph 1 of Article 1 states that the primary aim of the UN is to
“maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,
and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles
of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.” We here
see that a distinction is made between the dispute settling powers under
Chapter VI and the enforcement powers under Chapter VII. The former
powers are to be exercised “by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law”. These criteria, especially that of
conformity with international law, are not expressed in relation to the
“suppression of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression”. This means that in carrying out its functions in the context of
the peaceful settlement or adjustment of disputes the Council has no powers
to override or restrict the rights of the states under international law. In
contrast, when the Council is acting in the context of maintaining or
restoring international peace and security in Chapter VII, it is not bound by
legal considerations. The Council is not bound by international law when it
makes a determination under article 39, and it has the power to take
enforcement measures that infringe upon, restrict or suspend the rights that
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states normally are entitled to exercise both under customary and
conventional international law.186 This does not mean that the Council is
above the law or that legal considerations play no part in the Council’s
work. It means, however, that the Council does not need to base its
determinations upon considerations of international law, or even that such
considerations must necessarily be taken into account in determining that
enforcement measures are warranted in relation to a particular situation.187
The Council is a political organ and although they take legal factors into
account, the political consideration often overshadow legal
considerations.188 The Council must balance legal consideration, against
what is politically suitable, possible and desirable in each particular case.189
Even though the Council is not bound by international law in its exercise of
enforcement measures, it still must follow the purposes and principles of the
UN.
Paragraph 2 of Article 1 talks of respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples and paragraph 3 talks of promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. This poses
a limitation on the Council’s enforcement powers, in that it precludes the
imposition of any form of government by the UN on the population of a
state or other entity. The Security Council can not, by means of invoking the
enforcement powers, impose a particular form of government upon a
majority or significant segment of a population of any state or non-self
governing territory.190 This limitation on the Council to impose a particular
political system or constitutional arrangement upon a population is based
upon the fundamental principles of the independence of states and of respect
for the self-determination of peoples. However, “there is no reason why the
Security Council could not determine that particular members of a
government which are suspected of committing grave international crimes,
such as the perpetration of aggression or genocide, could not be divested of
governmental authority, arrested and placed on trial for their actions.” 191  It
is even conceivable that a particular political party or movement which has
committed such crimes or which propagated such crimes as part of its
objectives or “program” could be deemed organisations which posed a threat
to international peace and security.192 The duty of the Security Council to
respect human rights and humanitarian law was referred to the International
Court of Justice in the Namibia Advisory Opinion193, and has been
recognised by the UN in the imposition and implementation of both non-
military and military enforcement measures. This means that the Council
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must take account of the impact of sanctions upon the population of target
countries and ensure that UN civil and military personnel observe human
rights standards in the conduct of their operations.
Of the principles of the UN, paragraph 7 of article 2, could have been a
serious limitation on the powers of the Council. This so-called limit of
domestic jurisdiction states that: “Nothing contained in the present Charter
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VII.”
The limit of the domestic jurisdiction has been much discussed in practise
and in the literature, and the interpretation is still uncertain.194 It has been
argued that the limitation was intended to exclude all Security Council
review, whether discussion or resolution, either under Chapter VI or by its
recommendatory powers under Chapter VII, when the situation it is faced
with is essentially internal.195 In practice, the Security Council has
developed its own interpretation as to what constitutes intervention and
domestic jurisdiction. The practice is to interpret domestic jurisdiction
narrowly - the opposite of what was intended by the drafters of the
Charter.196 The very abundant UN practice indicates that the Council has
always, or nearly always, said that it could discuss and decide, despite
protests by the individual state or individual states addressed by the
resolution.197 The Council has adopted the view that the questions will cease
to be essentially matters of domestic jurisdiction if in its opinion they raise
issues of international concern transcending state boundaries.198 The areas in
which this has occurred are those of liberation of peoples under a colonial
regime, the protection of human rights and the struggle against governments
imposed by force or against governments considered oppressive. In each of
these areas the activity of the Council has ultimately unfolded in a direction
contrary to Article 2(7). The protection of human rights is to be seen in a
broad sense, so that “any situation within a given state which is injurious to
human dignity - from mistreatment of minorities and gross violation of
human rights, like genocide, ethnic cleansing, massive deportations and so
on, to the adoption of economic and social policies detrimental to the
population, to suffering imposed on the civil population by civil wars - is
now the subject of UN action, whether or not it constitutes the violation of a
specific international obligation.”199  Aside from human rights defined in
this broad sense, and aside from de-colonisation matters, the domestic
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jurisdictional clause may still be and still is, invoked for those sectors which
international law in principle leaves to the discretion of the individual state.
6.6.2 Political limitations
The most important political limitation to the Council’s power is the veto
power. This power allows the permanent states to block a Council decision
and hinder it to come into existence. This rule weakens the capability of the
Council in that its power to a large degree depends on the consent of the
permanent members. As we have seen the rules concerning the voting
procedure and the veto are laid down in Article 27 of the Charter, and in this
sense it is a legal limitation. The rule has however been used, and misused,
for political motives, and is therefore to be treated as a political limitation.
The veto has often been used in contradiction to the literal terms of the
Charter. The power of the veto has been exercised according to
considerations of interest rather than in accordance with the letter of the
Charter. 200 This was especially true during the Cold War between the
United States and the Soviet Union. The permanent members, particularly
the superpowers, interest and influences became so persuasive in the Cold
War that the veto effectively debarred the Security Council from taking
action or recommending measures of any sort in many areas of the world.
The veto undermined the role of the Council in armed conflicts in which the
permanent members were directly involved and prevented it from acting in
many of the armed conflicts in which the permanent members were
indirectly involved or had an interest. From 1946 to 1986 the actual use of
veto was as follows: Soviet Union 121; USA 57; United Kingdom 26;
France, 16, China 22.201
With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the number of vetoes has
decreased dramatically, for instance in 1991 no vetoes were cast by the
permanent members.202 Free of these powerful limiting factors, the Security
Council has been able to use the range of powers provided for in the Charter
more readily. The Council is however still conditioned by political
considerations. The significance of the veto will be shown in the following
Chapter on the use of the Council’s power.
Another political limitation can implicitly be found in Article 24(1), which
provides that the Security Council acts “in the name” of all UN members.
According to Benedetto Conforti the conduct of a state cannot therefore be
the subject of enforcement measures, “when the condemnation is not shared
by the opinion of most of the states and their peoples”.203 This limitation
implies that the Council has to be guided by the opinions in the international
community. Not only the opinion of the members in the Council is of
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importance, but also the other UN member states. The Council will not
adopt a resolution that they know will be unfavourably received by the UN
member states.
6.7 Development and use of powers within
limitations
6.7.1 General
In this part, I will take a closer look at how the Council has used its powers
in practise. I will give examples ranging from the earliest year of the
Council’s existence and up until today. In this way I will show how the
powers have been broadened beyond a literal interpretation of the UN
Charter, and how the political and legal limitations have restrained and
directed the work of the Council. Although the Council does not always
indicate on what Article, or even what Chapter, it adopts a resolution, I will,
for the clarity of the presentation, use the same grouping under the Articles
as in 6.5.1. In the division between the different Articles I will take guidance
from the wording of the resolutions as well as from the opinion of legal
authors.
Since the Council’s use of powers is closely connected with how the
Council has interpreted its own jurisdiction, I will begin with a look at this
question, before I go into the actual acting of the Council. As mentioned
before, the prerequisite for the Council’s jurisdiction in Chapter VII is that it
has made a determination that there exist a threat or breach of the peace, or
an act of aggression. The most interesting point of the Council’s jurisdiction
is how the line is drawn between Chapter VI and Chapter VII; in other
words how the Council has interpreted the notion of ‘threat to the peace’. In
the Council’s relationship with the ICC this distinction will be of great
importance, and I will therefore devote some pages to this topic.
6.7.2 Jurisdiction
6.7.2.1 Chapter VI jurisdiction
As noticed in the previous, the peaceful settlement function in Chapter VI is
limited to disputes and situations “the continuance of which is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security”.204 This
means that a matter must have a certain gravity in order for the Council to
have Chapter VI jurisdiction over it. The gravity may depend either on the
matter being disputed or the means and intensity with which the states
directly concerned claim to have their respective interests or points of view
prevail.205 In any case, the Council enjoys broad discretionary power in
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deciding whether a question actually may endanger the peace and therefore
deserves to be dealt with. The Council considers itself empowered to deal
with a conflict even when that conflict does not endanger international peace
and security. In the Eichmann case, for example, the Council pronounced
itself when Adolf Eichmann was abducted from Argentina, although quite
obviously this violation of Argentinian territorial sovereignty in no way
constituted a threat to world peace.206 The only limit is the fact that some
kind of difference, whatever it may be, exists between the states.207
The line between Chapter VI and Chapter VII jurisdiction has in the
Council’s practise not always been based on the nature of the conflict or
situation. In fact there are no substantive factual distinction between the
notion “danger to international peace” in Chapter VI, and “threat to the
peace”, which is the lowest prerequisite for Chapter VII jurisdiction.208
Instead political factors, including the need for consensus, has dictated
which Chapter a resolution has been based on. The use of the two different
notions often depend on what type of action the Council is ready to take, and
they are in effect, “merely ‘labels’ put into the resolutions to indicate the
political climate in the Council.”209
In the development of the Council’s actions in South Africa we can see that
the difference between “threat to the peace” and “danger to the peace” is not
an increase in the level of violence of a dispute or conflict, but the motives
and interest of the members of the Council. The Western permanent
members saw the protection of their economical interest in South Africa as
vital, and therefore their general aim was the prevention of a mandatory set
of sanctions being imposed against the government. Nevertheless, the
international pressure on South Africa and consequently on Western
governments forced them to grant some concession and to label the situation
as a threat to the peace.210 In the following section the determination that the
apartheid system in South Africa constituted a threat to the peace will be
discussed further. It is in this context sufficient to state that changing
political factors often affect the Council’s jurisdictional findings to a greater
extent than any legal criteria.
6.7.2.2 Chapter VII jurisdiction
6.7.2.2.1 Threat to the peace
The concept “threat to the peace” is the broadest and most indistinct concept
of Article 39. It is especially in regard to this concept that the Council’s
discretionary power is exercised. The term is very broad and elastic and,
unlike aggression and breach of the peace, it is not necessarily characterised
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by military operations or operations involving the use of armed violence.211
At the time of the drafting of the UN Charter, what was considered to
constitute “threat to the peace”, was military threats to international
peace.212 In its practise since 1945, the Security Council has exercised its
discretion in determining what poses a threat to the peace in a wide variety
of situations and thereby widened the term.213 I will here present some cases
in which the Council has found a breach of the peace to exist, and I will
hereby see how the Council in its practice has defined and widened the
concept, not only to cover the traditional inter-state disputes, but also intra-
state situations and conflicts.
The wide interpretation of “threat to the peace” came into full bloom in the
early 1990s with the end of the Cold War and the ensuing end of the
deadlock in the Security Council due to the loosening tension between the
Soviet Union and the United States.214 As early as in the 1960s however, the
Security Council had determined that the racist regime in Rhodesia
constituted a threat to international peace, and , as mentioned, in the 1970s
that the racial discrimination and the system of apartheid in South Africa
constituted a threat to the peace. When Rhodesia unilaterally declared its
independence from the United Kingdom in 1965, the Council condemned
the illegal racist regime.215 On November 20, 1965, the Council determined
that a continuation of the regime would be a threat to the peace216, and on
April 9, 1966 it was expressly formulated that the prevailing situation
represented a threat to the peace.217 In the case of South Africa the Council
has not made a finding in general terms that the apartheid system constitutes
a threat to the peace. The resolutions passed in condemnation of the system
have however entailed that the whole situation of “denying the South
Africans the right to self-determination” comes within the concept threat to
the peace.218
The members of the Council were apparently convinced that the danger of
armed conflicts in Rhodesia and South Africa would be brought about by the
racist regimes.219 On this basis, one can assume that internal conditions
within a state alone, such as massive violations of human rights, can be seen
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as a threat to the peace. The Council appears to have developed the term
“threat to the peace” not only to cover situations of traditional international
violence, in which the main danger to international peace is a conflict
between two or more states, but also situations where the danger instead
arises primarily from the internal events in one state, which in the case of
Rhodesia and South Africa was the denial of self-determination by racist
regimes. Jochen Frowein is however doubtful to the assumption that the
Council’s action in the case of Rhodesia and South Africa means that
internal conditions within a state alone can be seen as threat to the peace. He
means that one should look at the particular situation in southern Africa,
“including the danger of violent involvement with neighbouring states.”220
Another important factor in the Council’s determination of a threat to the
peace in the Rhodesia situation is, according to Frowein, the fact that the
United Kingdom, that under international law was still seen as the state
being responsible for Rhodesia, voted for the resolution.221 The cases show,
however, that the concept of a threat to the peace can be understood in an
extraordinary broad manner when there is unanimity within the Council.
According to Inger Österdahl, the resolutions issued in the Rhodesia and
South Africa question were “such isolated and exceptional events” in the
context of decolonisation and that there was no risk at this time that “the
broad construction of threat of the peace would spread”.222 The new trend of
the Council’s interpretation of a “threat to the peace” was instead set in the
beginning of the 1990s.
With the end of the Cold War the opportunities open to the Council under
Article 39 became much greater. The civil wars in Iraq, Yugoslavia and
Somalia were all designated threats to the peace within 1991-1992, not only
because of the massive scale of destruction in each of these conflicts but
also because of their adverse effects on neighbouring states. In the case of
the Kurds and Shiite Muslims in Iraq 1991, the repression of the civilian
population resulting in a massive transfrontier flow of refugees was
considered to threaten international peace and security in the region.223 In
the former Yugoslavia in 1991, the then civil war between Croatia, who
wanted to break away from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
and the Serb dominated central Yugoslavian authorities, was considered by
the Security Council to constitute a threat to international peace and
security.224  The Council must have assumed that fighting on a considerable
scale with the possibility of outside intervention can always be considered to
be a threat to the peace.225 226 Within the framework of Security Council
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action in the former Yugoslavia, the Council also found that crimes against
international humanitarian law constitute a threat to international peace.227
In order to reach this conclusion the Council referred back to its first
resolution in the case of Yugoslavia and “all subsequent relevant
resolutions”228 and expressed “its grave alarm at continuing reports of
widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law
occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, including reports of
mass killings, massive, organised and systematic detention and rape of
women, and the continuance of the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’, including
for the acquisition and holding of territory.”229 All in all, according to the
Council, this situation continued to constitute a threat to international peace
and security.230 This was the first time in its history that the Security Council
determined that crimes against humanitarian law constituted a threat to
international peace and it was in this context that the Council established the
ad hoc International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in order for the
perpetrators of the crimes to be brought to justice.231 In the case of Somalia,
a civil war and its consequences were again considered by the Security
Council to constitute a threat to the peace. The Council stated in the
beginning of 1992 that it was “gravely alarmed at the rapid deterioration of
the situation in Somalia and the heavy loss of human life and widespread
material damage resulting from the conflict in the country” and  “aware of
the consequences on the stability and the peace in the region” it adopted
resolution 733 of 23 January 1992.232 The Council was concerned that the
continuation of the situation would constitute a threat to international peace
and security.233
Even though the situation in Somalia was carefully conditioned on the
existence of “specific circumstances” and was not to be seen as constituting
a precedent, 234 these three above mentioned cases show how the Council
has determined a threat to the peace to exist in civil war situations which
have been combined with serious human suffering in different forms. It now
seems to be accepted that extreme violence within a state generally can be
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qualified as a threat to the peace. 235 236  From these cases we can draw the
conclusion that the Council is willing to determine civil wars as threat to the
peace, and thereby being able to use its powers under Chapter VII, under the
requirement that the situation has consequences for international peace. This
is fulfilled when the conflict threats to destabilise neighbouring states or to
engage outside powers.237
The most far-reaching use of the concept “breach of the peace” was made in
resolution 748 of March 31, 1992 concerning Libya. This resolution
represents a new development of the concept to cover aspects of terrorism.
The Council stated in an earlier resolution that international terrorism, in
this case the placing of a bomb on an aircraft that was destroyed over
Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988, constituted a threat to international peace and
security.238 The Council further stated that investigations implicated officials
of the Libyan Government in the destruction of the aircraft and requested
Libya to extradite the suspected terrorists.239 When Libya refused to comply
with the resolution, the Security Council determined that the continued
failure by the Libyan Government to respond to the request to extradite the
suspected terrorists constituted a threat to international peace and security.240
241
What we can see in these cases is that the Council’s discretion to determine
the existence of a threat to the peace is virtually unlimited. The Council has
taken a very broad view on what can constitute a threat to the peace. In 1992
the President of the Security Council made a statement concerning the
Council’s use of the term. Since this statement is very expressive as to how
the term has been interpreted by the Council, I will here quote a part of it as
a conclusion of this section. “The absence of war and military conflicts […]
does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military
sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological
fields have become threats to peace and security. The Council has the power
to characterise situations relating to internal disturbances, human rights
violations, civil conflicts or the acquisitions by a state of nuclear or other
weapons of mass destruction, as threats to the peace. Even the refusal of a
government or opposition group to accept the result of an election can be
deemed to constitute a threat to the peace, at least when it involves the
outbreak of hostilities between contending fractions or causes some
aggravation of international tensions, significant refugee flows or other
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(potential) cross-border effects. There seems to be some kind of
consequences requirement that an internal conflict poses a threat to
neighbouring states or threatens to draw in outside powers. If the Council
agree it can however determine a threat to the peace to exist also in a
situation which emanates from within one country only, and which does not
really threaten anything more than the domestic peace in the country. We see
how the Council has developed the concept to include even national
conflicts, but we also see that the Court has started to define crimes against
human rights as “threats to the peace”. The origins of the domestic
disturbances so far labelled “threats to the peace” have always been serious
violations of fundamental human rights either by the authorities or by
independent militias.”242
6.7.2.2.2 Breach of the peace
The term “breach of the peace” appears to be more straightforward than
“threat to the peace”. A breach of the peace exists when armed units of two
states are engaged in hostilities, and the majority of the members of the
Council deems the hostilities serious enough to invoke Article 39, but not so
serious as to constitute an act of aggression. It is generally accepted that the
determination of a breach of the peace is less serious than a finding of
aggression, but more serious than a determination of a threat to the peace.243
A breach of the peace can relate to any type of hostilities ranging from the
violation by one or both sides of a cease-fire agreement, a large scale border
incident, or act of terrorism, to full scale warfare by two or more states.244
“Various kinds of acts could be considered as constituting breaches of the
peace. It would seem logical that any resort to armed force would come
within the meaning of the phrase.”245
The Council has however only made a finding of beach to the peace on four
occasions; in relation to the North Korean invasion of South Korea246, the
Argentinian invasion of the Falklands247, the war between Iran and Iraq248
and the Iraqi invasions and occupation of Kuwait249.250 All of these cases
concern large-scale invasions by one state of another. In the case of Korea,
the Falklands and the invasion of Kuwait the more condemnatory term
“aggression” appears to be more suitable. In these cases the Council chose
not to label the attacks as acts of aggressions since the greater seriousness of
such a charge might have caused undue delay.251 In many cases of obvious
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breaches of international peace the Council has failed to make a
determination under Article 39, and some cases were not even discussed.252
In cases where the permanent members or its allies are involved the Council
is prevented from taking action because of the threatened use or the actual
use of the veto.253
6.7.2.2.3 Act of aggression
Aggression presumes the direct or indirect application of the use of force. It
is thus a special form of a breach of the peace. The particular designation is
justified in that with the determination of aggression, the party which has
caused a breach of the peace is established. Where an act of aggression
exists, there is an aggressor and when the Council makes such a finding it
labels or condemns one of the states as the guilty party. As with the terms
“threat to the peace” and “breach of the peace”, “act of aggression” is not
defined in the Charter. In the final stage of making the Charter, at the San
Francisco Conference in 1945254, many delegations proposed the inclusion
of a definition of aggression in the Charter.255 The committee concerned
rejected the idea and meant that the determination should be made by the
Security Council. They meant that any definition might hamper the
Council’s freedom of action by forcing premature application of sanctions or
by establishing standards that might not be easily applied in a particular
case. Despite these objections, the United Nations struggled for years to find
an acceptable definition to aggression, and in 1974 a Declaration of
Principles on the Definition of Aggression was adopted by the General
Assembly.256 The Declaration lists a series of cases of aggression, that range
from military invasion or occupation, to bombardment of land, sea or air
forces, to the blockade of ports or coasts, to the sending of bands of
mercenaries or to a state allowing its territory to be used for attacks against
another state’s territory and so on. This list does not however bind the
Security Council and does not effect Article 39 and the powers of the
Council. Nevertheless the Council can rely on the resolution in determining
aggression.
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The term aggression is used quite frequently by individual states in the
course of the Council debates.257 The Council as a whole is however
unlikely to agree to use it on a regulatory basis. The potential consequences
of a finding of aggression at the initial stage of a conflict, and the fact that
such a determination will not encourage the accused state to withdraw,
signify that there has been very limited Council practise on the term “act of
aggression”.258 Indeed before the adoption of the Definition of Aggression,
there has been no formal findings of aggression.259 Since 1974 the Council
has in many cases qualified short-term military actions by South Africa260
and Israel261 as acts of aggression. The condemnations so far relate to quite
limited acts of aggression and not to wider wars of aggression.262
Although the use of the term aggression in Council resolutions has increased
since 1974, the definition has not resulted in a consistent and objective use
of the term. The findings are mainly motivated by selective, discretionary
and political factors.263 Western states are still cautious about allowing a
finding of aggression against two friendly states. In the last few years, there
have been fewer incidents and no condemnations in terms of aggression
from the Council, reflecting the political mood of the Council towards
conciliation rather than confrontation.
6.7.3 Use of powers
6.7.3.1 Use of powers under Chapter VI
6.7.3.1.1 Supervision of the obligation to settle peacefully
The power under Article 33(2), to call parties to settle their disputes by
peaceful means, is the weakest form of Security Council response. An
appeal like this can be made as a first step in the Council’s dealings with a
conflict and work as a reminder to the states of their duties under the
Charter. 264 Although the responsibility of the parties to settle their disputes
peacefully continues to exist even after armed activities have begun between
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them265, a reminder of this duty is going to be ignored after the outbreak of
hostilities.266 To be effective the call should be followed by more far-
reaching actions if the conflict is continued. The possibility of future
Council actions under other provisions in Chapter VI and Chapter VII can
act as a warning to the concerned states.267 During the Cold War however,
the use of Article 33(2) was sometimes the only measure available to the
Council. Due to the fear that the permanent members would use its veto
power and block more far-reaching resolutions, the Council adopted
minimal measure resolutions aimed at securing the support of the permanent
members. An example of this attitude can be found in the Gulf War
between Iran and Iraq. In 1980 the Council made an initial call to Iran and
Iraq under Article 33(2).268 269 It then took seven years of bloody conflict
before the necessary consensus could be achieved to enable the Council to
adopt unanimously a resolution which contained a mandatory demand for
cease-fire within terms of Chapter VII.270
With the end of the Cold War procrastination like this have ceased. The
Security Council has been able to use the power of supervision in the first
stage of conflict, recommending the belligerents to settle their dispute by
peaceful means before the outbreak of hostilities. The recommendation can
then act as a warning to states not to use force, which may be particularly
powerful with the co-operation between permanent members, which more
readily indicate that the call will be followed by enforcement mechanisms.
An example of when a reminder under Article 33(2) worked as a warning of
future action is the dispute between Argentina and the UK concerning the
Falklands.271 In 1982, with an Argentinians invasion of the Falklands
imminent, the President of the Council made a statement and called on
Britain and Argentina “to exercise the utmost restraint at this time and in
particular to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region and to
continue to search for a ‘diplomatic solution’.”272 Although a “balanced
reminder”, the statement was a warning to Argentina not to invade. The
Argentinians needed a fair degree of international support if they were to
maintain their hold on the island, but the statement reflected unanimous
Council opposition to invasion. The Argentinians misread the signs and
carried out their threat to the almost unanimous condemnation of the
Council.273 The Council then found a breach of the peace and demanded
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withdrawal274, which although not complied with effectively put Argentina
in the wrong, helped to isolate it internationally, and contributed to
Argentina’s defeat in that it tacitly supported the British stance in support of
principles of international law.275
All observers agree that the Security Council has achieved only modest
results in implementing Article 33(2).276 Apparently the institutional
pressure exerted upon the parties to a dispute in accordance with Chapter VI
are somewhat lacking in persuasive impact.
6.7.3.1.2 Investigation
Under 6.5.1.3.2, we saw that a literal interpretation of Article 34 would only
give the Security Council the power to investigate disputes and situations for
the specific purpose of determining if they are likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security. Already under the early
years of the Council’s practice it was realised that it needed broader
investigatory powers in order to fulfil its functions.277 The Security Council
therefore also possesses implied powers to acquire information by means of
investigations, for other purposes than those under Article 34.278 Thus the
Security Council has at its disposal a general and all-encompassing
competence to make investigations.279 On this basis the Security Council
can, for example, order an investigation under Article 39 in order to
establish whether there exist a threat to or breach of the peace, or act of
aggression.280 The rationale of Article 34 is to enable the Council to acquire
all the necessary factual elements regarding an international situation in
order to determine its potential danger. Such an investigation may
indistinctly constitute the premise for the exercise of any one of the powers
of the Council regarding maintenance of peace, and therefore also the
powers envisaged in Chapter VII. 281
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The Council may carry out investigations either directly or, as usually
occurs, by creating an ad hoc subsidiary organ under Article 29.282
According to Rule 39 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure, the Council
may invite other persons to supply it with information or to give assistance
in examining matters within its competence.283 The functions of such
investigatory bodies often go beyond mere fact finding and enter into the
realm of good offices and peacekeeping.284
The fact that the Security Council has a general and all-encompassing power
also means that the organ is free either to purely and simply decide for an
investigation, or instead, to link the investigation to a certain function. It can
then decide, for example, that investigations are to serve only to ascertain
whether conditions exist for exercising the conciliation function, or for an
action to restore peace, and so on. Although there are some examples of
“restricted” investigations in the practice, the resolutions mostly have a
general nature. 285  This shows the clear intention of the Council not to link
the power of investigation to one or other of its functions.
 The power of investigation may also be exercised with regard to situations
and disputes in which the Security Council has already intervened in
exercising its functions in maintenance of the peace, but where it intends to
follow future developments with a view to further interventions.286 It can
establish subsidiary organs; such as truce commission, observation troops, to
oversee respect for truces and armistices in international and internal wars or
to monitor, to avoid or to investigate into violations of human rights.287 The
investigatory powers also furnish the framework for the creation of
subsidiary organs such as Commissions of good office, of mediation and so
on, which the Council may assign, besides their conciliation functions in
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accordance with art 36 and Article 39, also functions as investigation.288
Examples of truce commissions, observers, commissions of good offices
and of mediation with function of investigation are abundant in practise.
In resolution 39 of January 20, 1948, a Commission was appointed with the task of
investigating and mediating the Indo-Pakistan question. Resolution 619 of August 9,
1988, set up a group of military observers for supervising the cease-fire between Iran
and Iraq. Resolution 689 of April 9 1991, set up a group of observers for the respect of
the demilitarised zone between Iraq and Kuwait after the Gulf War. Resolution 1161 of
April 9, 1998, reactivated the International Commission of Inquiry in order to collect
information and reports relating to the sale and supply of arms to the former Rwandan
Government forces.
6.7.3.1.3 The settlement of disputes
The simplest kind of intervention under Article 36 is to make a mere
indication of procedure or method to follow to reach a settlement. The
Council can make an invitation to the interested states to, depending on the
case, seek a solution by mediation, submit the dispute to arbitration, and so
on. As mentioned under 6.5.1.3.3 the Council may recommend a procedure
or method found in Article 33(1), or other means of a similar nature. To get
a picture of how the Security Council has used this power I will mention
some resolutions where the Council has suggested different types of
procedures and methods.289
In resolution 1073, paragraph 3, of September 28, 1996, the Council called for the
immediate resumption of negotiations within the Middle East peace process. In the already
mentioned Gulf War, Iran and Iraq were requested by resolution 479 of 28 September,
1980, and 582 of 24 February, 1986, to accept mediation, conciliation, or other forms of
peaceful settlement. In resolution 530 of March 19, 1983, which, having expressed concern
about the danger of a military clash between Nicaragua and Honduras, recommended that
they resolve their dispute through the mediation of the Contadora group290. Examples of
cases where the Council has recommended involving the ICJ will be mentioned in next
chapter.
A second kind of intervention that can come within the framework of
Article 36 is when the Council does not only invite the states to have
recourse to a certain procedure or method, but itself provides for such
procedure or method. This is the reason for the Council’s creation of
subsidiary organs that may assist the parties in settling disputes or
situations.291 These organs can be composed in different ways, for example,
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by members of the organ, by Secretariat officials, by UN member states.
Examples of Commissions of good offices, of mediation, of conciliation are
numerous in practise.
Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, adopted several months after the Israeli Six-Day
War including a request addressed to the Secretary-General to send his own special
representative to the Middle East to favour the pacific settlement of the question.
Resolution 367, paragraph 6, of March 12, 1975, invited the Secretary-General to exercise
his good-offices in order to reach a solution to the Cyprus question. Resolution 693 of May
20, 1991, establishing an UN observation mission in El Salvador. See also 6.7.3.1.2
concerning the groups of observers with functions both of mediation and investigation.
Aside from the above-mentioned cases, any recommendation whose purpose
is to facilitate agreement among the states directly concerned can come
within the scope of Article 36. The only thing that the Council cannot do, on
the basis of Article 36, is to enter into the merits of the question.
As stated before, the Council has the power to enter into the merits of a
question under Article 37. This means that the Council can recommend how
to resolve a given difference, deciding who is wrong and who is right,
express condemnation of a given state conduct, and then require that it ends.
According to the Article, this power is subject to preconditions, such as the
referral by at least one party to the dispute. Very early in the case law
however, the view prevailed that the Security Council might also make
recommendations with the regard to the substance of the dispute in the
absence of a corresponding referral. The Security Council’s attitude towards
this matter was summarised by the representative from Peru as follows: “the
Council can be the judge of its own competence and can assume the powers
provided in Article 37.”292 It is possible to say that, owing to custom, the
power to initiate terms of settlement under Article 37 exists within the same
broad limits with which Article 33(2) and Article 36 grant the power to
recommend and to initiate procedures or methods of settlement.293 The
Council, then, is completely free, when faced with a dispute or situation that
can endanger the peace, both to indicate procedures and methods of
settlement and to recommend solutions on the merits.
The role of the Security Council under Article 37(2) is sometimes described
as being like that of a Court.294 But this comparison is only appropriate in so
far as the Council deals with the substance of a dispute. Important
characteristics of judicial decision are however absent; the members of the
Council are not independent, the Security Council does not have to decide
on the basis of applicable law295, and its recommendations are not binding
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on the parties296.  The role of the Council is, therefore, much more that of a
mediator.
Article 38 provides that the Council “may, if all the parties to any dispute so
request, make recommendation to the parties with a view to a pacific
settlement of the dispute”. As we saw under 6.5.1.3.3, the dispute does not
have to cross the threshold of being a danger to international peace and
security. Despite the fact that the Council, by means of this provision, could
involve itself in any kind of dispute as a mediator or conciliator, at the
parties’ request, it has not been used in this way.297
6.7.3.1.4 Reference to the International Court of Justice
The practise of the Security Council contains only one example of a
recommendation which was made by the reference to the wording of Article
36(3).298 In resolution 22 of April 9, 1947, the Security Council
recommended “that the United Kingdom and Albanian governments should
immediately refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice in
accordance with the provisions of the Court” in the context of the Corfu
Channel case. The only other use of Article 36(3) by the Council occurred in
1976 when Greece complained of “flagrant violations by Turkey of the
sovereign rights of Greece on its continental shelf in the Aegean”.299 In this
case the Council did not make an express reference to Article 36(3), but
merely said that “the Security Council […] invites the Governments of
Greece and Turkey in this respect to continue to take into account the
contribution that appropriate judicial means, in particular the International
Court of Justice, are qualified to make to the settlement of any remaining
legal differences which they may identify in connection with their present
dispute.”300
6.7.3.2 Use of powers under Chapter VII
6.7.3.2.1. Recommendations under Article 39
According to Article 39 the Security Council has the power to make
recommendations in situations coming under Chapter VII. The Council can
thus exercise its peaceful settlement function also in situations that
objectively qualify as threat to the peace or breach of the peace. Article 39
covers decisions with which the Council has condemned acts of armed
reprisals or actual invasions, inviting the states responsible not to repeat
them and threatening, but then not implementing, enforcement measures in
case of repeated offences.
One example of this type of recommendation is resolution 384 of December 22, 1975 and
389 of April 22, 1976, containing the invitation to Indonesia to withdraw its armed forces
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which has invaded East Timor. There have also been great many resolutions of this kind
adopted against Israel, for example, resolution 171 of April 9, 1962, and resolution 256, of
August 16, 1968.
Article 39 also comprises those resolutions that, in indicating procedural
terms of settlement, simultaneously adopt one of the other measures
contemplated by Chapter VII.
See for example resolution 502 of April 3, 1982, relating to the Falklands War, which
“demanded” an end to hostilities and “asked” Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek
diplomatic solution to their dispute. See also resolution 1160 of March 31, 1998 and 1199
of September 23, 1998 on the achievement of a political solution of the Kosovo crisis.
According to the wording of the Article the Council does not have the power
to recommend enforcement measures. It has however been maintained in
legal doctrine and in the practise that Article 39 authorises the Council also
to recommend enforcement measures like those regulated by Article 41 and
42.301  One example of such recommendation is resolution 569 of July 26,
1985, in which the Council recommended embargo measures in regard to
South Africa.302
6.7.3.2.2 Provisional matters
According to Article 40, the Council can call on the parties to comply with
provisional matter before making recommendations or deciding upon the
measures provided for in article 39. Provisional measures were meant to be
emergency measures preliminary to any other measures adopted under
Chapter VII. The Council has not however been rigidly bound from a
chronological point of view.303 An international crisis that can be qualified
as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression can develop
over long periods of time, and with altering turns of events, so that
interventions of different intensity may be necessary at different times. The
Council has therefore adopted several measures at the same time, and again
taken up provisional measures after having adopted other resolutions on the
basis of Chapter VII, for example, after having recommended settlement
procedures on the basis of Article 39 or after having decided upon
enforcement measures.304
A typical provisional measure under Article 40 is the cease-fire requested by
the Council during international or civil wars.
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Example of this can be found in resolution 27 of August 1, 1947 on the Indonesian war of
independence and in resolutions  233, 234 and 235 of June 6, 7 and 9, 1967 on the Israeli
Six-Day War. Another example is resolution 514 of July 12, 1982, in which the Council
finally adopted a mandatory demand for a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq. More resent
examples can be found in resolutions 713, para. 2, of September 25, 1991, 724, para. 8, of
December 15, 1991, and others on the war in former Yugoslavia, resolution  733, para. 4,
of January 23, 1992 on the civil war in Somalia and resolution 1199 of September 23, 1998
on the civil war in Kosovo.
Besides from cease-fire, the Council has used provisional measures when it
has urged the liberation of political prisoners in civil wars and wars of
independence305, and when it has invited states not involved in an
international or domestic conflict not to support the parties in conflict and
not to furnish them with armed troops or war materials.306 Other examples
of provisional measures are the request of the withdrawal of foreign troops
from territories in a state of civil war307, and the request that one of the
states involved in a war withdraws its own troops to certain positions308.
With the adoption of resolution 598, of July 20, 1987, on the Iran-Iraq
conflict, the view of the permanent member of the Council became quite
clear that orders on the basis of Art 40 may be  formally binding.
6.7.3.2.3 Measures not involving the use of force
Under Article 41, the Security Council has the power to impose measures,
not involving the use of force, against a state which, in the judgement of the
Council, has broken or threatened the peace or is to be considered an
aggressor. The Article mentions several examples of different boycott
measures of which complete or partial interruption of economical relations
is the most important. In the first part of this section, I will deal with the use
of the measures expressly mentioned in the Article, the so-called “typical
measures”. In the second part, I will discuss the “atypical measures”, that are
not specifically mentioned in Article 41, but still are considered to fall under
the Article.
During the Cold War period, there were not many decisions made by the
Council under Article 41. In fact, there were only two cases that came within
the framework of Article 41 as binding decisions. In the case of Rhodesia,
the Council ordered the complete interruption of economic relations as a
response to the racist regime in the country.309 The resolutions imposed a
series of measures, such as prevention of import and export, interruption of
                                                
305 See e.g. resolution 63 of December 24, 1948, on the war in Indonesia.
306 See e.g. resolution 50 of May 29, 1948, on the Middle East, resolution 169 of November
24, 1961, on the domestic situation in the Congo inviting the states not to send mercenaries
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307 See e.g. resolution 143 of July 14, 1960, with a request to the Belgian Government to
withdraw its troops from the Congo.
308 See e.g. resolution 660 of August 2, 1990, which demanded that Iraq withdraw
immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the position in which they were located on
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309 For  the situation in Rhodesia see 6.7.2.2.1
61
air services, closing of borders to Rhodesian citizens or to residents in
Rhodesia, that aimed at total isolation of the Rhodesian Government at the
time.310 In the case of the apartheid system in South Africa the binding
measures on the basis of Article 41 were restricted to an embargo on any
supplying of weapons to the South African Government. 311
After the end of the Cold War, Council resolutions coming under Article 41
have proliferated. The Council, freed from the reciprocal vetoes of the two
blocks, has intervened with measures not involving the use of force in the
most important international and domestic crisis that have occurred in recent
times.312 On August 6, 1990, after the invasion of Kuwait, the Security
Council adopted resolution 661, concerning Iraq. This resolution obliged all
states to break off all economic relations with Iraq, and, in particular, placed
an embargo on imports and exports from and toward this country and
prohibited all financial operations with the Iraq Government and with firms
under its control.313 With regard to the crisis in Yugoslavia, the first
resolution 713 of September 25, 1991, adopted when the civil war still
seemed to be a war of secession, was restricted to providing an embargo on
weapons intended for Yugoslavia. On the 31 of March 1992, when
Yugoslavia was reduced to Serbia and Montenegro, the Council adopted
resolution 752, that bound all states to adopt a series of economic sanctions
against Serbia-Montenegro. These sanctions included an embargo on
imports and exports, blocking of financial operations, suspension of all co-
operation in scientific and technical fields. The economical sanctions against
the Serbia-Montenegro were terminated by resolution 1074 of October 1,
1996. During the Kosovo crisis, in 1998-1999, the Security Council was
unable to take any decisions against this country, with the exception of an
embargo on arms and related materials.314 In the case of the crisis in
Somalia, another crisis which saw the Council take measures mainly
involving the use of force, resolution 733 of January 23, 1992, prohibited
the export of arms to Somalia.315 The Council has also imposed sanction
regimes against Libya. In resolution 748 of 31 March 1992, the Council
imposed a mandatory arms and air embargo against Libya, in order to make
it comply with an earlier resolution316.  In this resolution, Libya had been
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requested to extradite two Libyan citizens accused of the destruction of an
aircraft over the Scottish village Lockerbie in 1988.317
As noted earlier, the list of measures in Article 41 is not exhaustive.
Therefore, any decision or recommendation of the Security Council which
calls upon the state, explicitly or implicitly, to take actions which have the
outward character of sanctions with regard to a certain states, come within
the framework of this Article. Thus, the Council can mandatorily instruct the
member states not to recognise certain legal actions of a state identified as a
disturber of the peace. This is the case, for example, in resolution 252 of
May 21, 1968, adopted against Israel. The resolution stated that the Council
“considers that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken
by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tend
to change the status of Jerusalem, are invalid…”. Another example of such
an atypical measure, is resolution 662 of August 9, 1990, which declared
Iraq’s proclaimed annexation of Kuwait “null and void”.318
The most far-reaching use of Article 41 ordering measures not listed, was
made by resolutions 827 of May 25 1993, and 935 of July 1 1994, setting up
the two international tribunals to judge individual crimes committed
against the peace and security of humanity in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. The Security Council expressed the view that
these measures could contribute to the restoration of peace and to the halting
of these violations. Since this is of special importance for the Council’s
relationship with the ICC it will be further discussed in section 6.4.
As stated before, the decisions of the Security Council under Article 41 bind
a state in international law on the basis of UN law. The member states are
obliged by the UN Charter to carry out decisions regarding measures not
involving the use of force. The Council has however developed a power to
make non-binding recommendations under Article 41.319 They then leave
the states free to adopt the measures or not. The evolution of such a power
lies in political compromise. In almost every case in which voluntary
measures have been called for, the Western powers have objected to a
finding under Article 39 combined with mandatory sanctions.320 Examples
of voluntary measures within the framework of Article 41 are seen mainly,
but not exclusively, in the practise relating to the Cold War era.
In resolution 569 of July 26 1985, the Council recommended a voluntary
boycott against South Africa that went far beyond the military arms
embargo. In the Rhodesian situation a voluntary call for an arms, oil and
petroleum embargo, was made by the Council only days after the unilateral
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319 J. Frowein, Article 41, In: B. Simma, 1994, p. 627
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declaration of independence.321 322An example from recent practise is
resolution 1227 of February 10, 1999, urging all states to end immediately
all sales of arms and munitions to Ethiopia and Eritrea.
6.7.3.2.4 Measures involving the use of force
Article 42 provides that the Security Council can implement the military
measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
The following Articles lay down the ways in which the Council can take
such action. Article 43 and the following establishes that states are required
to enter into special agreements with the Council in order to establish the
armed forces to be utilised, and Article 47 states that the actual use of the
national contingents is to be decided by a Military Staff Committee.
Member states have however never made any of the special agreements
envisaged in Article 43 and the Military Staff Committee established under
Article 47 has remained a dead body which only holds regular ritual
meetings.323 When the Council has taken military measures it has been in
other forms than those prescribed in article 43 and following Articles.
Instead of acting directly, as described in Article 42, the Council has
authorised or recommended member states to use force against a state or
within a state, and placed the command and the supervision of military
operations in their hands. It is generally agreed that the absence of special
agreements with the Security Council, in the sense of Article 43, does not
preclude member states from placing troops ad hoc at the disposal of the
Council.324 The Council can use the power granted to it in Article 42
“without the mechanisms that were designed to make the imposition of
military coercion a practical option”.325 326 There are however different
views in the literature on how far the Council can go in delegating the power
to use force, and the question has been the subject of an extensive debate.327.
Although agreements under Article 43 are not necessary to make the
Council’s military option under Article a 42 practicality, the Charter does
strongly indicate that UN control of such military operations is an essential
prerequisite for the legality of military actions by the Security Council. I will
deal with the most important situation in which the Council has taken
military measures. Some authors hold that these are taken under Article 42,
some claim that there are other legal grounds. Most authors agree that the
Council can not order a state to take part in military enforcement action in
the same way that it can order a state to take part in a non-military
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enforcement action. This is so because a state is not obliged to take part in
military operations under Article 42 unless it has concluded a special
agreement under Article 43.328
In the Korean War the Council for the first time authorised the full-scale
use of force against an aggressor. When North Korea invaded South Korea
in June 1950, the Security Council passed a resolution recommending
member states to “furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may
be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace”.329
The Council later passed another resolution that recommended “that all
Members providing military forces […] make such forces available to a
unified command under the United States of America.”330 The resolution
also authorised the use of the UN flag and requested the United States to
provide the Council with regular reports “on the course of action taken by
the unified command”. It is questionable whether these resolutions can be
said to be taken under Article 42. Resolution 84 appears simply to delegate
responsibility to the United States, which applied 90 per cent of the force.
All the decisions concerning the operations of the forces were taken by the
United States, not the United Nations.331 It seems more accurate to see
Article 51 of the Charter, which guarantees the right of collective self-
defence, as the legal basis.332
A second case where the Council has given authorisation to a full-fledged
war is the second Gulf War. After having adopted a number of resolutions
under Article 41, as a reaction to the Iraq invasion on Kuwait the Council
adopted resolution 678 on the 29 of November 1990. This resolution
authorised member states, if Iraq were not to have retreated within January
15, 1991, to “use all necessary means to uphold and implement […] relevant
resolutions and to restore international peace and security.” There is no
doubt that the wording in the resolution was an authorisation to use armed
force. The US led Coalition of forces, operating under the umbrella of UN,
but not on this occasion using its flag, started its campaign against Iraq on
16 January 1991, soon after the deadline in resolution 678 ran out. Article
42 is frequently seen as the basis of this action,333 but there are different
views in the literature.334
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Measures short of war, but still definable as measures involving the use of
force, have also been authorised or recommended to member states. Among
these are the establishments of naval blockades, which are designated to
prevent trade by ships of any nationality with certain ports. An example of
this can be found in resolution 221 of April 9 1966 concerning the
Rhodesian case.335 In order to strengthen the prohibition on the sale of oil to
Rhodesia the Council called upon Great Britain to prevent “by the use of
force if necessary” the arrival of oil in the port of Beira336, which was
intended to continue by land for Rhodesia.337 Much larger naval blockades
have been set up more recently, during the second Gulf War and during the
Yugoslav crisis. In the first case, resolution 665 of August 25 1990, called
upon the member states to prevent any ship coming from or directed towards
the coasts of Iraq and occupied Kuwait from violating the embargo
established by resolution 661. In the case of the Yugoslav crisis similar
measures were ordered against Serbia-Montenegro with resolution 787 para.
12 of November 16, 1992.
As a concluding remark on this Article I would like to say that although
Articles 43 and the following have never been applied until today, this does
not mean that they are completely dead letters. The revitalisation of the
Council after the end of the Cold War entails that a “revival” of these
articles can not be excluded. In the “Agenda for Peace” Report, presented by
Secretary-General B. Boutros Ghali in June 1992338, it is indicated that the
agreements under Article 43 may be concluded in the future.
6.7.4 Powers in the field of criminal responsibility
The Councils power to take action in the field of criminal responsibility is
not expressly mentioned in the Charter. There is however nothing in Charter
law to prevent the Council itself from acting in this field. The language of
the Charter does not rule out individual responsibility or the penal
consequences thereof.339 Action against individuals must be seen as an
implied power, not expressly mentioned in the Charter, but necessary for the
Council to fulfil its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security. The Council has at various times touched
on the issue of criminal responsibility. In the crisis in Rhodesia in the 1960’s
there were discussions surrounding the guilt of the local leader Ian Smith in
his individual capacity. In resolution 837, of 6 June, 1993, the Council
called for the prosecution of General Aideed, who led the United Somali
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Congress in Somalia.340 The Council also came close, in the Iraq-Kuwait
crisis, to imputing responsibility to individuals341, although ultimately opted
for state responsibility.342
With Resolution 827 of May 25, 1993, establishing the independent
Tribunal for the prosecution of crimes against humanity committed by
individuals in the former Yugoslavia, the Council took a big step in the field
of criminal responsibility and for the first time created a court with criminal
jurisdiction.  A similar Tribunal was, by resolution 935 of July 1, 1994,
established to judge the crimes against humanity in Rwanda. The Tribunals
were established as enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.
Most authors hold that the Council’s decisions to establish the Tribunals
qualify as measures short of the use of armed force under article 41 of the
Charter.343 As mentioned in 6.5.1.4.3, the list of measures in Article 41 is
not exhaustive and the Council can decide on atypical measures not
mentioned in the Article. As we have seen, the Council’s implied powers are
limited by the  purposes and principles of the UN. The establishment of
international tribunals to try and punish persons responsible for war crimes
and crimes against humanity would be consistent with the purposes of the
UN, with respect to maintaining international peace and security, resolving
threatening situations in conformity with principle of justice and
international law and promoting respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms without the distinction as to sex, language, or religion.
As mentioned in 6.7.3.2.3, the Council had already determined that the
widespread violations of international humanitarian law in the former
Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace and security, which, as
we know, is a prerequisite for such a measure under Article 41.344
Furthermore, in the case of Yugoslavia, the Security Council clearly
expressed its view that the establishment of the tribunal would make it
possible to bring to justice the persons responsible for ethnic cleansing and
other violations of international humanitarian law and would thereby
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“contribute to the restoration and maintenance of international peace”.345
The effective prosecution of such persons by a neutral international body
would deter further atrocities and break the cycle of violence and retribution
by providing a credible threat of punishment. In the case of Rwanda, the
large scale of killings of civilians had more or less ceased when the
resolution on the tribunal was adopted.346 The Council however points out
that the prosecution in Rwanda, of persons responsible for serious violations
of international humanitarian law, would contribute not only to stopping
killings and thereby to the restoration of peace, but also to the process of
national reconciliation and thus to the maintenance of peace.347 Thus, the
establishments of the tribunals were clearly justified in the context of the
Council’s broader efforts to restore peace and security in the regions.
The legal basis for the establishment of the Yugoslavia Tribunal Council
was questioned by the defence in the Tadic case.348 The defence argued that
“it was never intended by the Charter that the Security Council should,
under Chapter VII, establish a judicial body, let alone a criminal tribunal.”349
It was further argued that the Council could only deal with threats to the
peace, and since only states can threaten international peace and security, the
Council could not create criminal liability or prosecute physical persons.350
The Tribunal however upheld that it had been established under Article 41
as a measure contributing to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the
former Yugoslavia. It meant that since the Tribunal was intended to
contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace, the course the
Council took in establishing it “was novel only in the means adopted but not
in the object sought to be attained.”351 The Tribunal held that the measures
listed under Article 41 were not exhaustive and that no good reasons had
been advanced “why Article 41 should be read as excluding the step […] of
creating the International Tribunal to deal with the notorious situation
existing in the former Yugoslavia.” 352 The Tribunal also held that no basis
had “been established for denying to the Security Council the power of
indirect imposition of criminal liability upon individuals through the
creation of a tribunal having criminal jurisdiction. On the contrary, given
that the Security Council found that the threat to the peace, posed by the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia, arose because of large scale violations of
international humanitarian law committed by individuals, it was both
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appropriate and necessary for the Security Council, through the International
Tribunal, to act on individuals in order to address the threat to the peace.”353
The validity of the creation of the ICTY was upheld in the Appeals Chamber
of the Tribunal for former Yugoslavia.354  The validity of the ICTR was
upheld in the Kanyabashi case of 18 June 1997. 355
The establishment of the international criminal court should eliminate the
need for the Security Council to establish ad hoc tribunals in the future.
Even though one of the ideas behind the creation of the ICC was to remove
the need for ad hoc tribunals, the Security Council keeps this power to create
ad hoc tribunals even after the coming into force of the International
Criminal Court.
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7 Relationship between the ICC
and the Security Council
In the first chapters of this thesis we have seen that the essential function of
the ICC will be to assume jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community. The ICC is intended as a
permanent, universal, judicial and therefore impartial and independent body,
drawing its powers from the Rome Treaty. As a judicial body, the ICC will
be concerned only with the criminal responsibility of the individuals who
allegedly have committed the most serious crimes, and to create
international justice. The Security Council on the other hand, is there to act
in response to an ongoing crisis; it draws its competence and powers directly
from the Charter, which gives it the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security. As a political body with
broad discretionary powers, it is legally entitled to base its arguments on
political consideration, while remaining bound by the rules and purpose of
the Charter.356 At this stage we can conclude that the functions of the two
entities are fundamentally different; the judicial functions of the Court are
quite separate from the political functions of the Council.
Looking at the kind of situations in which the Court will, and the Council
already does work, we however see that, though not identical, they overlap.
The situations that would give rise to crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes357, will most likely impact upon the international
peace and security and therefore be dealt with by the Security Council.358 As
seen from the Council’s past practise it has interpreted its own jurisdiction
very broadly. The Council’s concept of “threat to the peace” rangers over
all, or most, of the core crimes included in Article 5 of the Rome Statute.
The two bodies will therefore operate in different spheres, acting on the
basis of their own independent procedures, but they will in fact be acting in
the same situations. As a result it will be imperative to strike a proper
balance between the role of the Security Council and the role of the ICC.
From the Council’s viewpoint the new institution can play a critical role in
helping to maintain the peace, in the way that prosecution deters criminal
behaviour and to the extent justice enables the peace.359 The work of the
ICC can however also frustrate the work of the Council, in the way that
external judicial intervention has the potential to “compromise peace and
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national reconciliation”.360 The investigation or prosecution in a particular
case by the Court could, for example, interfere with the diplomatic
resolution of an on going conflict by the Council.361
In the following, I will look at the relationship between the Security Council
and the International Criminal Court from the viewpoint of the Court. From
the Court’s perspective, its future relationship with the Council is of a
double nature. On one hand the Court should have a close relationship with
the Council. The Council can provide political backing and the Council’s
referral of cases to the Court will probably be of the outmost importance,
since they do away with the requirement discussed in chapter 4. In practise,
sustained co-operation between the Council and the Court will be needed for
the Court to remain effective. On the other hand the independence and
impartiality of the Court is essential. The Court must be beyond the political
influence of the Council in order to be a credible judicial institution. The
concern of many states and legal writers is that if the Court is subject to the
political influence of the Council, this will undermine its judicial
independence and credibility.362 Legal purists have strongly voiced a desire
for a Court that would function in an apolitical manner.363 As seen in
chapter 6 the Council, although it takes legal factor into account, often make
its decisions on political considerations. A judicial organ must, as noted by
the Secretary-General, “perform its functions independently of political
considerations” and cannot “be subject to the authority or control of the
Security Council with regard to its judicial functions.”364 The Court should
pursue justice based on recognised standards of international law and avoid,
as much as possible, situations that allow political considerations to
intermingle in the functions of the Court. It was argued among the legal
purist that the Court could only function effectively if it carried out “blind
justice”.365 The question how to find a balance between these two objectives
and, in other words, what role the Council will play in relation to the Court
will be addressed in the following.
In the following chapters I will take the ILC Draft Article 23 as a starting
point. According to this Article the Council would be given three powers
concerning the Court’s jurisdiction. The first one, laid down in Article
23(1), can from the Court’s perspective be called a “positive power” and
concerns the Council’s ability to refer cases to the Court and thereby
extending the Court’s jurisdiction. This power will be discussed in chapter
8. The second power, in Article 23(3), can be called a ‘negative power’,
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since it concerns the Council’s competence to defer the proceeding, and
thereby limiting the jurisdiction of the Court. This will be discussed in
chapter 9. The third and “neutral power” appointed to the Council by the
ILC, was the power to determine that an act of aggression had occurred.
This will not be further discussed since no agreement was made on the
matter and it therefore did not make its way into the final Statute.
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8 Security Council referral
8.1 General
The first role envisaged for the Council is connected with the trigger
mechanism of the Court. In chapter 5 it was noted that three entities have the
power to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction, namely the state parties, the
Prosecutor and the Security Council. In this chapter I will take a closer look
at what role the Council will play in triggering the Courts jurisdiction. The
questions of the Council’s power to initiate proceedings before the Court
turned into a matter of substantial controversy in the negotiating process,
especially in the negotiations before the Rome Conference.366 In order to get
a good understanding of these negotiations I will first take a look at the
provision as it was proposed in the ILC Draft and the arguments for and
against the proposal that were presented by the different delegations at the
preparatory negotiations. I will then present the different questions regarding
Council referral that were negotiated at the Rome Conference. The last part
of the chapter will be addressed to the final Article in the Statute and the
questions surrounding the wording of this Article.
8.2 ILC Draft Statute
8.2.1 Contents of ILC Draft Article 23(1)
Article 23(1) of the ILC Draft367 gives the Security Council the power to
refer matters to the Prosecutor involving threats to, or breaches of
international peace and security within the meaning of Chapter VII of the
UN Charter. The Article reads:
“Notwithstanding article 21, the Court has jurisdiction in accordance
with the Statute with respect to crimes referred to in article 20 as a
consequence of the referral of a matter to the Court by the Security
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.”
First of all it can be noted that the ILC, by referring to the list of crimes in
Article 20 of the Draft, meant that the Council should have the power to
trigger the prosecution of the same kind of crimes as the states and the
Prosecutor.368 An important difference from a state referral, or an initiation
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of proceeding by the Prosecutor, is however that the preconditions for the
exercise of jurisdiction in Article 21 of the Draft are left aside when the
Council is triggering the jurisdiction. Article 21 stipulated two conditions.
Firstly, the Court’s jurisdiction had to be triggered by a state that had
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. Secondly, the jurisdiction of the Court
with respect to the crime which was the subject to the complaint had to be
accepted by the custodial state and the state in the territory of which the
crime had occurred.369 By inserting the phrase “notwithstanding Article 21”
the ILC dispends with the two requirements and thus enables the Court to
act in the absence of referral or consent to jurisdiction by a state. The ILC
felt that such a provision was necessary in order to enable the Security
Council to make use of the Court.370
The commentary to the ILC Draft states that Article 23 was not intended in
any way to add to or increase the powers of the Council as defined in the UN
Charter.371 It was understood that this would have been neither legally nor
politically possible.372 Instead, the provision makes available to the Council
the jurisdictional mechanism created by the Statute. The ILC thus stipulates
that the powers of the Court are brought into play when the Security Council
makes a reference to it, in other words, it empowers the Court, not the
Council.373
8.2.2 Arguments in favour of ILC Draft Article 23(1)
8.2.2.1 General
At the Ad Hoc Committee several delegations were of the view that the
Security Council should be authorised to refer matters to the Court374, and at
the Prep Com most delegations favoured retaining the Article.375 There were
mainly three arguments presented in favour of giving the Council the power
to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction. Firstly, this would remove the need for the
Council to create ad hoc tribunals and secondly it would provide political
support to the Court’s actions. A third argument concerned the fact that
Council referrals would do away with the requirement of state acceptance of
jurisdiction.
8.2.2.2 Remove the need for ad hoc tribunals
During the preparatory process, delegations supporting the inclusion of the
Council among the entities having the power to initiate proceedings before
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the Court, pointed to the fact that this would remove the need for the
creation of ad hoc tribunals in the future. As noted in 6.7.4 the Council has
on two occasions created ad hoc tribunals; the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The legality of these creations have been
upheld by the ICTY in the Tadic case376 and by ICTR in the Kanyabashi
case377. It was here recognised that that the Security Council can establish a
judicial organ “in the form of an international criminal tribunal as an
instrument for the exercise of its own principal function of maintenance of
peace and security”.378
The states in favour of keeping Article 23(1) meant that it was a better
solution to let the Council have the ability to refer situations to the Court
than force the Council to create other ad hoc tribunals. They argued that if
the Council was authorised to refer matters this would remove the need for
creating additional ad hoc tribunals.379  At the Prep Com some delegations
held that one of the purposes of the Court was to obviate the creation of ad
hoc tribunals, and they meant that it would be absurd to create a Court that
was not available to the Council.380 To compel the Council to “continue in
future to pursue the ad hoc route would have been impractical and
wasteful.”381 It was also argued that the Council would have more control in
these ad hoc tribunals since it could decide who was to be prosecuted, and
that the referral to the permanent Court therefore was to be preferred.382
These kinds of arguments were also forwarded by the human rights
organisations. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights stated that “given
the authority to establish ad hoc tribunals as an enforcement measure under
Chapter VII, it is difficult to see why the Council should be barred from
recourse to the ICC when it perceives judicial intervention in a given
situation would be beneficial.”383 The LCHR underlined that the Council
would still keep its power to establish new ad hoc tribunals, and refers to
Article 23(1) as “an alternative” to such establishment in the future. The
Human Rights Watch argued that the only way that the establishment of the
ICC would eliminate the need for the Council to establish ad hoc tribunals in
the future was if “the ICC is capable of fulfilling the function that such
tribunals might fulfil”.384 By this they meant that the Council should be able
to initiate proceedings before the Court, and thereby confer its powers on the
Court, in order to obviate the need for further ad hoc tribunals.
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8.2.2.3 Provide political support
Another reason forwarded in favour of keeping Article 23(1) in the Statute,
was that it would provide political support for the prosecution. “By referring
a situation to the Court, the Council would shoulder part of the political
pressure of pursuing sensitive investigations and prosecutions springing
from the referral.”385 The Council would be signalling to the Court and the
international community its political support for that investigation and
potential prosecution. It was argued that any subsequent indictment would
carry more political weight than an indictment resulting from a situation
referred merely by one or more state parties.386 Not to give a power of
referral to the Council would therefore most likely have diminished the
authority and standing of the Court.
8.2.2.4 Provide the Prosecutor with cases
A third argument forwarded was that, since referrals by the Council would
carry no jurisdictional acceptance requirements, Council referrals would be
an important source of work for the prosecutor. As mentioned earlier, in the
case of state referral and initiation of proceedings by the Prosecutor, the
preconditions in Article 21 of the Draft had to be met. An Article 23(1)
referral by the Council would however “allow the ICC to bypass the
elaborate state party consent requirements” 387, where jurisdiction over a
person could be exercised only if the ICC received consent of both the state
that had custody of the suspect and the state on whose territory the crime
was committed. A Security Council referral would in this way “activate a
mandatory jurisdiction” and the jurisdictional reach of the Court would be
extended to the whole world. 388 Article 23(1) has also been explained as to
introduce a form of “compulsory jurisdiction”.389 This, it was argued, would
be highly significant for the Court’s effectiveness since it would provide the
Prosecutor with many cases that would otherwise have been outside the
scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. 390
8.2.3 Argument against ILC Draft Article 23(1)
8.2.3.1 General
As mentioned before, Security Council referrals were controversial during
the negotiations. Some state delegations argued throughout the negotiation
process that the Council should not be able to play any role at all in the work
of the Court and opposed to giving the Council the power to initiate
proceedings. The grounds for objection can be ordered into three different
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categories. The first category concerns the fact that there should be no
political intervention in what was intended to be a wholly independent
judicial process. The argumentation in the second group stressed the fact
that the provision would lead to inequality between the permanent members
of the Security Council and the other states. The third category of objections
were raised on the basis that the Council had no legal competence, under the
UN Charter, to refer matters for criminal prosecution by an international
tribunal.
8.2.3.2 Politisation of the Court
During the preparatory negotiations some delegations opposed to giving the
Council any power to initiate the proceedings on the ground that this would
subject the functioning of the Court to the decisions of a political body and
therefore undermine the Court’s independence and credibility.
Already in the International Law Commission did some members voice the
concern that Security Council involvement might lead to politisation of the
Court. They were concerned that Article 23(1) “might be read as endorsing
detailed involvement by the Security Council in the prosecution of
individuals for crimes”, something which in their view should never be a
matter for the Council.391At the debate on the ILC Draft Statute in the Sixth
Committee of the General Assembly, several speakers held that such a
provision was unsuitable and should not be part of the Statute of the Court,
because the Security Council was a political body and should under no
circumstances be involved in the prosecution of individuals.392
Several delegations at the Ad Hoc Committee expressed serious reservations
or opposition to the role envisaged for the Security Council, which, in their
view, would “reduce the credibility and moral authority of the Court;
excessively limit its role; undermine its independence, impartiality and
autonomy; [and] introduce an inappropriate political influence over the
functioning of the institution”.393 Some delegations at the Prep Com
requested the deletion of the Article on the basis that it would “effect the
independence of the Court in the administration of justice.”394 Delegations
holding this view believed that a political body should not determine
whether a judicial body should act. In their view, the Security Council was a
political organ whose primary concern was the maintenance of peace and
security, resolving disputes between states and having sufficient effective
power to implement its decisions. According to these delegations, the
Council made its decisions taking into account political considerations. The
Court, in contrast, was a judicial body, concerned only with the criminal
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responsibility of individuals who committed serious crimes deeply offensive
to any moral sense.395 396
8.2.3.3 Unequality between permanent members and other
states
A second argument forwarded was that a provision such as the one in
Article 23(1) is inequitable in that this specific trigger would only be used
against states other than the permanent members of the Council since the
latter could use their power of veto to prevent referrals which impinged on
their interests. The allegations were that this power put the permanent
members of the Security Council into an unduly privileged position by
guaranteeing them from future jeopardy. The delegations forwarding this
view meant that the permanent members would unlikely agree to refer to the
Court a situation involving themselves.397 The jurisdictional reach of the
Court would thereby cover the whole world, including non-parties to the
statute, except the permanent members of the Council that were non-
members to the statute. Some delegations argued that the permanent
members thereby could impose obligation on non-states parties, while they
themselves were shielded from prosecution.398
8.2.3.4 Objection that the Security Council lacks the legal
competence of referral
Objections were also raised on the basis that the Council had no legal
competence under the Charter to refer matters for criminal prosecution to an
international tribunal. As mentioned, the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia in 1995 upheld the validity of the creation by the
Security Council of the Tribunal pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII of
the Charter.399 After this case no serious doubt seemed to exist that the
Security Council had the competence to establish ad hoc tribunals if the
Council considers it to be necessary for the maintenance of international
peace and security.400 At the negotiation it was argued that the ICTY’s line
of reasoning in the Tadic case must be valid not only when the Council
wants to create a new ad hoc tribunal, but also when it would solely confer
certain competence’s upon an already existing criminal court. 401 The
objection that the Council lacked legal competence of referral was therefore
dropped quite early in the negotiating process and was not forwarded at the
negotiations in Rome.
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8.3 Negotiations at the Rome Conference
8.3.1 General
Quite soon at the Rome Conference it became apparent that the possibility
for the Security Council to refer particular situations to the Court pursuant to
Chapter VII, as envisaged by the ILC, was practically undisputed.402 It was
clear to the great majority of delegations at an early stage that the right of the
Security Council to activate the Court would become an important part of
the Court’s jurisdiction. There was however a few states that argued for an
exclusion of such a provision. Since this opinion was held by only a very
small minority group, the discussions at the Rome Conference were not
centred on the question of whether to give the Council a right of referral or
not. Among the delegations supporting referrals by the Council there were
however discussions on whether the Council should refer “matters”, “cases”
or “situations”. Another question discussed at the Conference was the
Charter basis for Council referral; should the Council only be able to refer
situations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or should the power of
referral be widened as to enable the Council to refer matters pursuant to
Chapter VI as well. Each of these questions will be discussed in their proper
sections.
8.3.2 Remaining arguments against Security Council referral
Only a few states, such as Mexico403, and in particular India, did not want to
allow the Security Council to have any role in connection with the Court’s
activities. India formally moved to have the Article on Security Council
referral deleted during the closing meeting of the Conference in Rome. 404 In
its explanation of the vote in the final session of the Plenary of the
Conference the Indian delegation proceeded to make the following
statement: “[t]he power to refer is now unnecessary. The Security Council
set up ad hoc tribunals because no judicial mechanism then existed to try the
extraordinary crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.
Now, however, the ICC would exist and the states parties would have the
right to refer cases to it.”405 The head of the Indian delegation went on to
state that to give the power of referral to the Council would “imply that
some members of the Council do not plan to accede to the ICC, will not
accept the obligations imposed by the statute, but want a privilege to refer
cases to it.”406
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8.3.3 Referral of “matters”, “cases” or “situations”
Even if India, among others, criticised the right of referral, the immense
majority of states admitted that such a right to refer situations to the Court
was an application of the primary responsibility of the Security Council over
matters concerning peace and security under Article 24 and Chapter VII of
the UN Charter.407 Among those delegations supporting referrals by the
Council, there was a division as to whether the Council should refer
“matters”, “cases” or “situations”.  This discussion had in fact been going on
throughout the prenegotiations, but no solution had been reached, and the
negotiations therefore continued at the Rome Conference. Both at the pre
negotiations408 and at the Rome Conference many delegations felt that the
Council should only be empowered to refer a general matter or situation
rather than a specific case to the Court, in order to preserve the Court’s
independence in the exercise of its jurisdiction.409 If the Council had the
power to refer “cases” it could refer a particular crime or a case against a
particular accused. If the Court was empowered to refer “situations” or
“matters”, the bringing of individual prosecution would instead be a matter
within the discretion of the Court, based on investigations that it had carried
out pursuant to the referral. The delegations in favour of the latter choice,
meant that by choosing the word “situation” or “matter” instead of “cases”
the prejudicing of the Court would be minimised and it would “preserve the
independence and autonomy of the Court in the exercise of its investigative,
prosecutorial and judicial functions.”410 On the other hand, states which
favoured the use of the term “case”, argued that a referral by the Council
should be put on par with referrals by states, as was the case in the ILC
Draft.411 The Draft was however changed to the effect that the states have
the power to refer “situations” and not “cases”.412 This argument presented
at the preparatory negotiations therefore became irrelevant.
By the end of the preparatory negotiations, the possibility of referring
“cases” had been rejected and the text which was submitted to the
Diplomatic Conference in Rome contained only two options: the narrower
concept of “matter” and the wider one of a “situation”.413 As between those
two terms, those who preferred “situations” argued that the referral of
“matters” by the Council was still too specific for the independent
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functioning of the Court. It was also argued that the term “situation” would
be closer to the terminology of Chapter VII. 414
8.3.4 Charter basis for referral
Although a clear majority supported a provision of Council referral, there
were different views at the Conference as to what the UN Charter basis for
such a referral should be. The ILC Draft required that the referral was based
exclusively on the Council’s Chapter VII authority.415 This provision meant
that, before referring a matter to the Court, the Council would have had to
have made a determination under Article 39 of the UN Charter, that there
had been a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.
Already in the preparatory negotiations there were however suggestions
made that the power of referral should be widened as to enable the Council
to refer matters pursuant to Chapter VI of the Charter as well.416 This would
imply that the Council could refer situations “the continuance of which [are]
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,”417 as
well.418 At the Prep Com Articles 33 and 36 of the UN Charter were
mentioned as Articles appropriate as a base for Council referral.419 As
mentioned in 6.5.1.3 these articles give the Security Council the power to
encourage the states to find a peaceful solution to their disputes, and to
recommend the “appropriate procedures” of dispute settlement. It was noted
at the Prep Com that one of these “appropriate procedures” mentioned in
Article 36 was “judicial settlement”.420 Those pressing this point suggested
deleting “Chapter VII” from the ILC Draft so that Chapter VI actions would
also be covered. This option was presented to the Rome Conference for
discussion in Article 10(3) of the Prep Com Draft Statute.421
The states that supported this latter option at the Rome Conference argued
that it would be inappropriate, if not a violation of the UN Charter, for the
Court to restrict the basis upon which the Council makes referrals. Moreover
they meant that there was “no legal reason dictating that referrals be made
only under Chapter VII.”422 The delegations in favour of the wording in the
ILC Draft, that only Chapter VII situations could be referred, argued that
Chapter VII “makes it a more powerful referral, as the Council would be
more likely to enforce rulings.”423
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In the legal literature it has been argued that the Council’s referral of
situations under Chapter VI would clash with the “compulsory jurisdiction”
that a Council referral would imply.424 This line of arguing is based on the
assumption that only resolutions under Chapter VII are binding according to
Article 25 of the UN Charter. As concluded before the “compulsory
jurisdiction” is a consequence of the fact that Council referrals enable the
Court to act in the absence of a referral or consent to jurisdiction by a state.
Vera Gowlland-Debbas states that if the Council could refer situation under
Chapter VI the Council could “initiate proceedings leading to the
prosecution of individuals who are in the custody, or have committed a
crime in the territory, of a state which has not accepted the jurisdiction of
the Court, on the basis of a non-binding resolution which is not regulated by
Article 25 of the Charter.”425 She notices further that Article 36(3) of the
UN Charter, which mentions that the Council in its recommendations shall
take into consideration that legal disputes should be referred to the
International Court of Justice, can only recommend but not oblige states to
submit their disputes to judicial settlement.426 In the case of the International
Criminal Court the Council would however, according to the relevant
proposal, be able to impose compulsory jurisdiction in a non-binding,
Article 36, resolution.
The Human Rights Watch however came to another conclusion in this
question. The HRW were also of the opinion that the member states should
be bound, to give effect to the Court’s decisions, when the Council had
referred a matter to the Court. They argued, however, that the binding nature
of decisions is not determined by whether they are taken under Chapter VI
or Chapter VII, but whether they are intended to bind all member states.427
They meant that when the Council was dealing with a matter, whether under
Chapter VI or Chapter VII, and it is brought to its attention that a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court might have been committed, it should be
able to refer that matter to the Court under either Chapter.428 The HRW
stated that the commission of such grave crimes as those within the
jurisdiction of the Court almost always constitute a threat to the peace, [or a]
breach of the peace, as envisaged in Chapter VII and therefore concluded
that the decisions to refer matters to the Court should, in general, be taken
under that Chapter. They were however of the view that the Council should
not be precluded from referring a situation to the Court when the
“commission of a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction comes to the
attention of the Council in circumstances which are not deemed to constitute
a threat to international peace and security”. They argued that what was
essential was that the binding nature of the Security Council decision was
clear.429
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8.4 Article in the Rome Statute
8.4.1 General
The final text was adopted in Article 13(b). The relevant parts of Article 13
reads:
“The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred
to in article 5 in accordance with the provision of the Statute if:
…
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations”.
From this text it can be concluded that the negotiations at the Rome
Conference resulted in a provision that allows the Council the power to refer
a “situation” instead of a “matter” to the Court. The power is pursuant only
to Chapter VII and not Chapter VI of the UN Charter and no additional
formal requirement are imposed. Since all these features have been
discussed in the previous sections, I will here only mention a few words
about each.
8.4.2 Referral of “situations”
As previously mentioned, the fact that the Council can only refer
“situations” and not “cases” or “matters”, makes it possible to maintain the
proper separation between the action of the Security Council in the political
sphere and the unique attribute of the Court to determine guilt or innocence.
The Council can not refer a particular crime or case against a particular
accused, but it remains the exclusive responsibility of the prosecutor to
determine which individuals should be charged with crimes. With this
wording of the provision, the arguments forwarded against the ILC Draft
becomes less relevant. There is not a great risk for politisation of the Court
since, although the Council’s decisions are based on political considerations,
these considerations will not determine the actual bringing of individual
prosecution. Also the argument of inequality between the permanent
members and other states carries less weight under the final Statute, since
the Council will not have the power to “engineer a reference ‘against’
whatever state they chose.”430 It is however still true that the permanent
members, that are not parties to the Statute, can shield themselves from
prosecution by using their veto power.
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8.4.3 Meaning of the phrase “acting under Chapter VII”
As mentioned earlier, the term “acting under Chapter VII” seems to mean
that the Council must have made a determination under Article 39 of the UN
Charter that there has been a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of
aggression. The question has however been put in the literature whether the
Council has to take positive action under the Chapter. It has previously been
noted in that the Council, after making such determination, is not
automatically required to proceed to enforcement action binding on member
states under Article 25 of the Charter. The Council can merely resort to
making a recommendation under Articles 39 or 40, or indeed decide not to
act at all. The question if the Council has to take binding enforcement action
in order to be able to refer a situation to the Council is usually answered in
the negative in the literature.431 Gabriël H.Oosthuizen432 states that it is
possible that the word “acting” signifies more than a mere decision in terms
of Article 39. He is however of the opinion that the term “acting” does “not
need to be interpreted as meaning that the [Security Council] would also
have to decide on Article 41 or Article 42 measures in order to make such a
referral.”433 The meaning of the phrase “acting under Chapter VII” will
remain an open question until the Court has been established.
8.4.4 No additional formal requirement
Just as in the ILC Draft, no additional requirements are imposed on a
Council referral. When the Council adopts a binding decision to that effect,
it overrides the requirement for state consent that would otherwise apply
under the Statute before the Court could exercise jurisdiction.434 This arises
by implication out of the fact that Article 12 lays down state consent as a
precondition only in the case of references by a state party or action by the
prosecutor proprio motu under Article 13, but not for the case of Chapter
VII referrals by the Security Council.435 This means that the Court can
exercise jurisdiction over a case referred to it by the Council where the
alleged crimes were committed in a non-state party to the Statute. Whether
the state on whose territory the alleged crime was committed, the state of
nationality of the alleged perpetrator or the custodial state is a party to the
statute or not, does not make a difference. This will be particularly helpful in
securing jurisdiction in situations which would not otherwise fall within the
competence of the Court. The provision will therefore probably be highly
significant for the Court’s effectiveness.
                                                
431 See e.g V. Gowlland-Debbas, 1998, p.101-102 and G.H Oosthuizen, Some Preliminary
Remarks on the Relationship between the Envisaged International Criminal Court and the
UN Security Council, In: Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. XLVI, Issue 3, 1999,
p.313-342, at. p.368-372
432 Associate Legal Officer at the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia.
433 G.H Oosthuizen, 1999, p.370
434 See  4.2.4 for the preconditions otherwise applicable
435 Compare with the ILC Draft that had the same effect.
84
9 Security Council deferral
9.1 General
A second and more controversial role for the Security Council, in the
jurisdiction of the Court, is its power to defer the Court’s proceedings.
While the Council’s power to refer cases, discussed in the previous chapter,
serves to expand the Court’s jurisdiction, enabling the Court to exercise its
jurisdiction irrespectively of whether the states concerned are parties to the
Statute, the power to defer prosecution would shrink the Court’s
jurisdiction. The question in what situations and under which conditions the
Council should have this power was the centre of numerous debates at
nearly all levels of the negotiating process leading up to Rome. I will first
present the provision as it was proposed by the ILC and the arguments pro
and con this proposal that were voiced in the pre negotiating process before
the Rome Conference. I will then devote a section to a proposal called the
“Singapore compromise”, since it signifies a turning point in the
discussions, before I go into the negotiating process in Rome. In the last part
of this chapter I will present the final wording of the Statute and how it
differs from the ILC Draft. In this way I can verify if the criticism against
the Draft is still valid or if the right balance between peace and justice seem
to have been struck in this respect.
9.2 ILC Draft Statute
9.2.1 Contents of ILC Draft Article 23(3)
Under Article 23(3) of the ILC Draft436, prosecution is precluded if it is
related to or arises from a dispute or situation that “is being dealt with” by
the Security Council, unless the Council specifically authorises it. Article
23(3) of the Draft Statute reads:
“No prosecution may be commenced under this Statute arising from a
situation which is being dealt with by the Security Council as a threat to
or breach of the peace or an act of aggression under Chapter VII of the
Charter, unless the Security Council otherwise decides.”
The commentary to the Draft Statute explains that this provision is a
consideration of the Security Council’s primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security. The International Law
Commission regarded the provision as an “acknowledgement of the priority
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given by Article 12 of the Charter of the United Nations”. 437 According to
the provision the Court requires prior authorisation of the Council for a
situation, which is being dealt with by the Council under Chapter VII. Due
to the specific voting procedure of the Council438, this construction would
permit any permanent member to veto a Council resolution authorising the
Court, and thereby blocking proceedings of the Court. The ILC, however,
considered it to be a well balanced co-ordination between the Court and the
Council, since the Court only would be barred to act in those cases where
the Council had made a determination under Article 39 and was in fact
acting under Chapter VII.439 In this way it did not “give the Council a mere
‘negative veto’ over the commencement of prosecution”.440 Once the
Chapter VII action was terminated the possibility of prosecution being
commenced under the Statute would be revived according to the ILC.
9.2.2 Arguments in favour of ILC Draft Article 23(3)
The Draft Article was supported by the permanent member of the Security
Council. Throughout the negotiations of the Statute, they expressed the
concern of a possible conflict between the jurisdiction of the Court and the
functions of the Security Council. They argued that the investigation or
prosecution in a particular case by the Court could interfere with the
diplomatic resolution of an on-going conflict by the Council.441 An example
given was a peace agreement where the participation of an indicted person is
necessary for the negotiations for a peaceful settlement, and danger exist
that the person concerned will be apprehended once participating in such
negotiations.442 Since prosecution by the Court could disrupt a peace
process, it was argued that as long as the Security Council was taking action
in a situation, it would not be appropriate for the Court to commence or
continue proceedings in a case related to that situation.
At the Ad Hoc Committee the delegations in favour of the provision argued
that the approach in 23(3) was necessary to preserve the Council’s capacity
to perform its functions for the maintenance of international peace and
security under Article 24 of the Charter. 443
Also during the sessions of the Prep Com did the permanent members of the
Security Council support the Article.444  France and the United States were
the strongest supporters of retaining the provision. These delegations
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expressed the view that “it would be unacceptable if the Court were
empowered to act in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations and to
interfere in delicate matters under consideration by the Security Council.”445
According to this view, paragraph 3 should be revised to include, not only
Chapter VII situations, but all situations which were being dealt with by the
Council. Christopher Keith Hall446 reports: “France argued that the Security
Council should screen all state complaints to see if they involve a situation
of threat to or breach of international peace and security. The United States
argued that no state complaint concerning a situation that the Security
Council was actively considering could be referred to the Court until the
Court agreed.”447
These arguments put forward by France and the United States supported the
International Law Commission’s grounds for inserting a provision like the
one in Article 23(3). However, they went further than the ILC Draft in that
they wanted to include not only Chapter VII situations, but also Chapter VI
situations, and in fact all Security Council action. According to the ILC
Draft the Council had to “deal with a situation […] under Chapter VII” and
this was to be interpreted to mean that the Council in that situation had to
take positive action under the Chapter. Proposals, such as the one forwarded
by the US and France would, in the view of the ILC, give the Council a mere
‘negative veto’ over the commencement of prosecution.448
9.2.3 Arguments against ILC Draft Article 23(3)
9.2.3.1 General
The provision was criticised by many delegations in the negotiating process
leading up to the Rome Conference. Already in the ILC did several members
take the view that the paragraph was undesirable. To clarify what kind of
criticism that were forwarded, I will divide them into four categories. The
first two kinds of criticism are similar to the first two categories of criticism
regarding Council referral; namely that it would lead to politicisation of the
Court and unequalitly between the permanent members and the other states.
These arguments carry more weight in the case of Council deferral of
proceedings, and as we shall see they were shared by a greater number of
delegations. The third point of criticism was that the ILC Draft did not
contain a time limit for how long the proceedings could be deferred. The last
category contains the criticism, not on the wording of the provision, but of
the actual grounds or rationale of inserting a provision at all. In this chapter I
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will present the four categories of criticism as they were forwarded in the
ILC, the Prep Com and in the Ad Hoc Committee, as well as the criticism
from legal commentator, human rights organisations and other NGOs.
9.2.3.2 Politisation of the Court
The arguments concerning the politisation of the Court has the same basis as
the arguments in 8.2.3.2, that there should be no appearance of political
intervention in what was intended to be a wholly independent judicial
process. In contrast to the Security Council, which takes political
considerations into account when making its decisions, the Court, as a
judicial body, must be concerned only with the criminal responsibility of
individuals who have committed serious crimes. The concern of many states
was that if the Court was subject to the political influence of the Council,
this would undermine its judicial independence and credibility.449 This fear
is more pertinent in this case of Council deferral than Council referral.
During the negotiation process, even the delegations favouring a provision
that would give the Council the power to defer the Court’s jurisdiction, were
concerned with this problem. Many delegations at the different steps of the
negotiating process agreed that the Council should have some sort of control
over the Court’s action, as not to disturb the sensitive political
considerations by the Council. The powers accorded to the Council in
Article 23(3) were however seen to be too broad and far-reaching and
thereby threatening the independence and impartial functioning of the Court.
Several members of the ILC took the view that paragraph 3 was undesirable,
since “the processes of the Statute should not be prevented from operating
through political decisions taken in other forums.”450 Also in the Ad Hoc
Committee did some delegations point at the political character of the
Council and argued that “the judicial functions of the court should not be
subordinated to the action of a political body.”451 A number of delegations
in the Prep Com were of the opinion that the ambit of paragraph 3 was too
wide “as to infringe on the judicial independence of the Court.” 452
Most participants at the 29th UN Issues Conference opposed to granting the
Council the power in Article 23(3), as it would “compromise the
independence of the Court, allowing a political body to control a judicial
body thereby politicising the Court and undermining its independence and
legitimacy.”453 These participants argued that if the Council had the power
to stop investigations or prosecution, “justice would become a bargaining
chip to be used in Council-sponsored peace negotiations.” 454
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The human rights organisations following the negotiations also criticised the
proposed Article 23(3). Human Rights Watch stated that the control the
Council would have over the Court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction would
constitute a serious threat to the independence of the Court. HRW stated that
“[s]ubjecting the Court to the control of the Security Council - and to its
highly political decision making process - would have a profoundly negative
impact on the Court’s ability to function independently, as well as on its
legitimacy, authority and creditability.” 455 The Human Rights Watch went
on to argue that allowing any one of the permanent members of the Council
to veto the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction, in the way that Article 23(3)
would do, “would reduce the ICC from an independent judicial body to a
subordinate body of the Security Council and render judicial hostage to the
political whims of the permanent members of the Security Council”.456 Also
other NGOs commented on the politisation of the Court and meant that
Article 23(3) would seriously effect the Court’s independent functioning.
The International Red Cross found it difficult to “reconcile the principle of
an independent and impartial court with the fact that, in certain cases, the
court would be dependent on the Security Council or subordinated to its
actions, and might thus be prevented from performing its duties freely.”457
The provision has also in the legal literature been criticised as to subject the
Court to the political influence of the Council. Daniel Derby458 is of the
opinion that granting the Security Council the effective means to limit the
exercise of jurisdiction will effectively render the ICC a “political tool of the
Security Council”.459 As such, he argues, the Court would be utilised only
on such occasions where political will or public support demanded the
punishment of individuals.460
9.2.3.3 Unequality between permanent members and other
states
The provision was also criticised for extending the privileged position of the
permanent members of the Council and for creating an inequality between
these states and states not members of the Council. This argument was also
forwarded against Council referral, but it is of greater importance in the
context of Council deferral. Since the provision would give to each of the
permanent members of the Council a power to veto a resolution authorising
the prosecution, it would in effect permit them to confer immunity from
prosecution on their own nationals. As seen in 6.3 and 6.6.2, due to the veto
power of the permanent members of the Council, there exist an inequality
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between them and the other member states of the UN. The veto power
makes them immune in the sense that they can veto resolutions in which
they are directly involved or have an interest. As stated in 6.3 the central
theory behind the right of veto is that since the permanent members bear the
main burden of responsibility for maintaining peace and security, no one
permanent member should be compelled by a vote of the Security Council to
follow a course of action with which it disagrees. There is certain logic
behind the veto power when it comes to enforcement action, for such action
could not realistically be launched against one of the permanent members.
The same logic can however not be applied to prosecution of individuals.461
The International Law Commission argued that it would be hard to pursue a
government to become a party to a treaty that would apply to all states
except the permanent members of the Council. The provision in 23(3) was
therefore “not likely to encourage the widest possible adherence of states to
the Statute.”462 Later in the negotiation process, the states not permanent
members of the Council continued to hold that the veto power granted to the
permanent members effectively would shield them from prosecution.463  It
was argued that, at a minimum, “the ICC would never be able to exercise
jurisdiction over breaches of the peace occurring in any of the nations with a
permanent seat on the Security Council.”464
The provision was also criticised on this ground by human rights
organisations,465 and by some legal authors. Among these are Daniel Derby,
who stated that the role that the ILC assigns to the Council in relations to the
Court “would place non members of the Council at a disadvantage in terms
of influencing court behaviour.” 466
9.2.3.4 Lack of time limit for deferral
The provision in Article 23(3) was also criticised on the ground that the
Court could, in effect, be deprived of jurisdiction by the mere placement of a
situation on the agenda of the Council, where it could remain under
consideration for a potentially indefinite period of time.467 If there was
inaction by the Security Council after it has placed the relevant item on its
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agenda, the Court would forever be precluded from acting on the matter.468
In 6.7.3.2 we saw that international crisis, that fall under the Article 39
definition, can develop over long periods of time, and that the Council
therefore can keep them on their agenda for many years. Many cases can be
found in the Council’s practise where it has made a determination under
Article 39, but then waited a considerably long time before acting, and in
some cases it has not acted at all.469
In the report of the ILC this kind of criticism was not forwarded. This is
probably due to the way they intended the words “being dealt with […]
under Chapter VII” in Article 23(3) to be interpreted. As previously
mentioned the Commission interpreted it to mean “a situation in respect of
which Chapter VII action is actually being taken” by the Security
Council.470 They were of the opinion that the Council had to take positive
action under Chapter VII in order to defer the Courts jurisdiction and that
when the Council action was terminated the Court could commence
proceedings regarding the situation.471 It was first in the negotiating process
following the ILC Draft that this weak point was discovered and criticised.
In the Ad Hoc Committee concern was voiced that the Court could be
prevented from performing its function through the mere placing of an item
on the Security Council’s agenda and that it could be “remained paralysed
for lengthy periods”, not only while the Security Council was actively
dealing with a particular situation, but also when it  “retained the item on its
agenda for possible future considerations.” 472  In the Prep Com, where the
same type of concern was forwarded, reference was made to the large
number of situations that were under the consideration by the Security
Council and the fact that in many of those cases the Security Council had
been ‘seized’ for more than 30 years without taking effective action.473
Some delegations at the Prep Com proposed to include a provision stating
that “should no action be taken in relation to a situation which has been
referred to the Security Council as a threat to or breach of the peace or act of
aggression under Chapter VII of the Charter within a reasonable time, the
Court shall exercise its jurisdiction in respect of that situation”.474 The
purpose of this proposal was to allow the Court to take action in situations
where the Security Council, though seized of a matter, would not or could
not act upon it.
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9.2.3.5 Critisism of the grounds for inserting the provision
Last, but not least, there was criticism, not only to the formulation of the
provision, but of the grounds for inserting the provision. As previously
stated, the ILC meant that the provision was an acknowledgement of the
Security Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security. The whole idea for inserting the provision
was the thought that the work of he Court could interfere with the
diplomatic resolution of an on-going conflict by the Council. Some critics of
the Article meant that this assumption was wrong and that the recent years’
conflicts demonstrate that justice is necessary for lasting peace.475
This kind of criticism was primarily produced by human rights
organisations. The Human Rights Watch held that the grounds for inserting
such a provision was non-existent. First of all they meant that the functions
of the Court were quite separate from the political functions of the Court,
but that there were very much complimentary in the protection of
international peace and security.476 They held that the argument that ICC
jurisdiction may interfere with the promotion of peace agreements was
spurious. “Rather, any suggestion that the Court’s jurisdiction might be used
as a negotiable element in any potential peace agreement brokered by the
Council should be rejected”.477
Neither the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights could see that there was
a conflict between the need to ensure international justice and the
competence of the Security Council to maintain and restore peace and
security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.478 They meant that “[t]he
nature of the crimes over which the ICC would have jurisdiction renders
untenable the argument that the Court should not be able to interfere with
the Council’s peacekeeping efforts in Chapter VII situations [---] On the
contrary, it was the realisation that there can be no peace without justice that
rekindled international interest in establishing an International Criminal
Court.” 479 Accordingly, they emphasised that the Courts ability to proceed
with an investigation or prosecution should not be subject to Security
Council approval.
In the 29th UN Issues Conference some participants stated that the Council’s
role as the paramount institution preserving peace and security should be
maintained, but argued that it is far from clear whether investigations or
prosecution by an international tribunal would always threaten the peaceful
resolution of a conflict.480 Unlike the human rights organisations, these
critics did not mean that the provision should be excluded, but argued that
the roles of the Security Council and the Court “need to be carefully
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calibrated and balanced to avoid potential negative consequences of judicial
intervention in ongoing peace negotiations”, and that Article 23(3) was a too
blunt instrument that left too much discretion to the Council.481
9.2 The Singapore compromise
During the negotiations leading up to the Rome Conference a proposal was
introduced that to a great extent lessened the grounds for criticising the
Council’s power to defer proceedings. This compromise formulation
eventually became known as the “Singapore compromise” 482 and proposed
the opposite effect as compared to the ILC Draft. The ILC Draft stated, as
mentioned, that no prosecution could be commenced unless the Security
Council otherwise decided. This meant that any permanent member of the
Security Council could unilaterally have used its veto power under Article
27 of the UN Charter to reject a proposal for commencing Court
proceedings and thus block the proceedings. The Singapore compromise,
however, proposed that proceedings of the Court may proceed unless the
Security Council takes a formal decision to stop the process. Since the
adoption of a Security Council decision requires a minimum of nine
affirmative votes in the Council, the Court’s proceedings may only be
stopped by a concerted effort of the Council’s members. Theoretically, not
even all five permanent members joined together could block the Court’s
proceedings, since nine votes in favour is needed for a valid decision. Thus
the possibility that one single permanent member, by exercising its veto
power, would suspend the jurisdiction of the ICC would be excluded.
Pursuant to the Singapore formula, the ‘negative veto’ given to the Court by
the ILC text would be replaced by a ‘positive’ arrangement where the Court
could exercise its jurisdiction unless it was directed not to do so by the
Council.
There was a general support for the alternative language adopted in the
Singapore compromise, and at the Prep Com a significant number of states
that previously preferred to delete Article 23(3) supported the proposal.483
Three of the Security Council’s permanent members; China, Russia and the
United Kingdom, also expressed interest in the compromise.484 Although
many delegations favoured the Singapore compromise to the ILC Draft
proposal, no decision was reached on the subject by the end of the
preparatory negotiations. The different views were presented as options to
be considered by the Diplomatic Conference in Rome.
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9.3 Negotiations at the Rome Conference
9.4.1 General
The different views, presented as options to be discussed at the Rome
Conference, can broadly be classified into three groups. The first group
supported the approach taken in the ILC Draft Statute and demanded
affirmative action by the Council before the Court could act.485 A second
group were those in favour of the Singapore compromise that demanded
affirmative action by the Council to require the Court not to act.486 The third
group opposed to giving the Council any role at all and they moved to have
the provision excluded.487
9.4.2 Support of the first option
During the Rome Conference the permanent members continued to hold that
the Court should not undermine the authority of the organ.488 The United
States ambassador to the Rome Conference stated that “[t]he Council must
play an important role in the work of the permanent Court [which] must
operate in conjunction -not in conflict- with the Security Council and its role
and powers under the Charter.” 489 It was however only the Malawi
delegation that expressly supported the first option, which prohibits the
Court from commencing a prosecution arising from a situation with which
the Security Council is dealing, unless the Council otherwise decides. 490
The United States delegation seemed to support the first option, but as stated
earlier, they insisted that the Council should not, as in the ILC Draft, be
limited to situations arising under Chapter VII.
9.4.3 Support of the second option
The second option, that required the Council to take affirmative action in
order to block the proceedings, was supported by 32 states. Among these
were China, Russia and the United Kingdom, all permanent members of the
Council.491 In its opening statement at the Rome Conference the Czech
Republic stated that it could not support the idea that the Council should
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have the power to preclude proceedings before the Court if a situation is
being dealt with by the Security Council under Chapter VII.492 During the
negotiations at the Conference, the delegation however supported the
Singapore compromise in the second option, during the negotiations. Also
New Zealand expressed concern for the implied politisation of the Court if
the Council had too broad powers to defer proceedings, but supported the
second option.493 Another example of a state supporting the second option is
Italy. In his opening statement to the Conference, the Italian Minister of
Foreign affairs called for solutions that balanced relations between the
Security Council and the Court, ensuring that it can perform its judicial
functions in total independence and without hindrance.494 By these examples
we see that the states, that at the preparatory negotiations argued that the
Security Council should not direct or hinder the functions of the Court, now
were in favour of a provision such as the Singapore compromise. These
states that had stressed the importance of an independent Court that was free
from political influence, were of the opinion that this provision would not
lead to politisation of the Court and would not compromise the Court’s
independence.
9.4.4 Support of the third option
A minority of 12 states supported the third option and opposed to inserting a
provision at all.495 They were throughout the Conference against granting any
such power to the Security Council. Some of these states voted against the
Statute of the Court in pursuance of their opposition to the role given to the
Security Council. India, in its explanation of the vote stated that: “the power
to block is in some ways even harder to understand or to accept. On the one
hand, it is argued that the ICC is being set up to try crimes of the gravest
magnitude. On the other hand, it is argued that the maintenance of
international peace and security might require that those who have
committed these crimes should be permitted to escape justice, if the Council
so decrees. The moment this argument is conceded, the conference accepts
the proposition that justice could undermine international peace and
security.” 496 India went on to state that: “[t]he statute violates this
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fundamental principle of international law by conferring on the Council a
power which it does not have under the Charter and which it cannot and
should not be given by any other instrument.”497 This last view was
supported by the Arab states. In its General Statement after the Statute had
been adopted, Sudan, on behalf of the Arab group of states, declared that the
Statute increased the power of the Council.498
9.5 Article in the Rome Statute
9.5.1 General
The text finally adopted in Article 16 of the Statute reads:
“No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded under
this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a
resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be
renewed by the Council under the same conditions”
In the first part of this section I will discuss in what aspects the final Article
differs from Article 23(3) in the ILC Draft. In this way I hope to see to what
extent the criticism forwarded in the negotiating process is still relevant, and
assess if the Article is a well-balanced compromise between the points of
view presented at the negotiations. By comparing the final Article to Article
23(3) of the ILC Draft four major differences can in my view be detected.
First of all there is the “reversed veto” as in the Singapore proposal, and
secondly a 12-month time limit of deferral has been introduced. The third
and forth differences are that, while in the ILC Draft the suspension or
prohibition would apply only to the commencement of a prosecution, in the
final Statute it applies to the commencement and continuance of an
investigation or prosecution. In the second part of the section I will look at
the question on what grounds the Council can make a request of referral, and
the significance of the phrase ‘resolution adopted under Chapter VII’
9.5.2 Differences from the ILC Draft Article 23(3)
9.5.2.1. Reversed veto
The text finally adopted in article 16 is based on the Singapore compromise
and the second option discussed at the Rome Conference. As stated before
the provision in the ILC Draft prevented the Court from acting on a
situation, unless the Council otherwise decided. The provision would
therefore give to each of the permanent members of the Council a power to
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veto a resolution authorising a prosecution. The Conference in Rome
managed to depart from such a strong dependence of the Council and turned
around the ILC provision. From an automatic consequence of seizure by the
Council of the situation, the deferral or the suspension of prosecution by the
Court can only be the result of a formal request by the Security Council on
the basis of a resolution under Chapter VII. According to Article 27(3) of
the UN Charter, such a decision by the Council requires the votes of nine
members, including the five permanent members. As a result, no single
permanent member of the Council can block a case from coming to the
Court.
The Article signifies an acceptable compromise between requiring the Court
to obtain Security Council permission and precluding the Security Council
from any ability to stop investigations. On one hand, much of the criticism
against the ILC Draft, that it was too far-reaching and that to much power
would be given to the Council’s permanent members, becomes less relevant
when the provision is turned around. The Court would not be as sensitive to
the Council’s political influence and the permanent members of the Council
would not be able to shield its own nationals from prosecution in a way that
was feared if one single permanent member could exercise its veto power
against Court action. The Council has to decide on a case to case basis, with
full use of the veto, whether to bar the Court’s proceedings or not. Although
Council jurisdiction is still presumed under the Statute, the fact that the
Council has to take a positive decision of referral in each case should offer
the necessary guarantee that the process will be managed in restraint. On the
other hand the Article does “not amount to an illegal interference with the
competence of the Council under the Charter” given the fact that the organ
itself, but not just a single permanent member, would still be in position to
stop any proceeding.499 The Article still gives the Council an important
position with regard to the Court, if no permanent member vetoes the
resolution calling for deferral. The fact that the Council has the primary
responsibility for international peace and security does not mean that it
should have full control over case referral to the Court. “Such control would
result in the Security Council exerting a dominating rather then a merely
significant role.”500
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Law, Vol. 10, No.1, 1999, p.93-107, at p.97
500 G. Hafner, K. Boon, A. Rübesame, A Response to the American View as Presented by
Ruth Wedgewood, In: European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, No.1, 1999, p.108-
123, at p.113
97
9.5.2.2 Time limit for deferral
While the ILC Draft had no time limit to the deferral, the final text states
that the suspension of proceedings is limited to a 12-month period. This
period is renewable and the Article does not restrict the number of times the
Council can make such a renewal request.
The ILC Draft was criticised on the ground that the deferrals could last for
an indefinite period of time. It was noted that the Council often was seized
with a matter for longer periods without the Council taking positive action.
The Court could in these cases forever be precluded from acting on the
matter. By the introduction of a time limit these arguments lose some of
their importance. Since the 12-month period can be renewed perpetually, a
case can still under the Statute be blocked from reaching the Court at all. For
this effect the Council, however, has to make a public and political sensitive
request every 12 months. In this request they have to state that the
continuance of the blocking is necessary in order not to obstruct their work
for international peace and security. It will probably be hard to make such a
request in a situation where the Council has made a determination under
Article 39, but remains inactive. The fact that the veto power is effective
even when a request for renewal is made also serves as a restraint on the
process.
The time-limit is, in my view, not in breach of the UN Charter and the
power there given to the Council. The Council has the possibility to renew
the 12-month period as long as they find Court proceeding or investigation
unwise. Ruth Wedgewood501 however holds that, “[t]he Rome Statute
displaces the traditional power of the Security Council, requiring that a vote
for suspension of ICC action be renewed every 12 months”.502 She argues
that the 12-month period is not sufficient because delicate situations will
often continue for many years. She goes on to say that “[t]he Rome Statute
attempts to limit the power of the Security Council - forbidding the Council
from suspending the investigation of a matter for more than 24 months even
in a situation where the Council holds that immediate criminal prosecutions
would complicate its efforts for, say, a cease-fire.” 503 It is quite obvious that
Wedgewood has misunderstood Article 16. As stated before, the period of
12-months is not only renewable once, but an unlimited number of times.
Article 16 and the time limit thus fails to limit the Security Council’s
powers in the way Wedgewood describes.
Furthermore, if there would be a conflict between Article 16 and a Security
Council resolution, taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the latter
would take precedence. If, for example, the resolution request an indefinite
duration, or duration in excess of 12 months, the states would still be bound
by this resolution pursuant to Article 25 of the UN-Charter. As seen in
                                                
501 Professor of Law, Yale University
502 R, Wedgewood, 1999, p.97
503 Ibid.
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chapter 7, Article 103 of the UN-Charter provides that, in the event of a
conflict between the obligations of the members of the UN under the Charter
and their obligation under any other international agreement, their obligation
under the Charter prevails. While the Court, as a non-party to the UN
Charter, would not be bound to refrain from proceedings after the expiry of
the 12-months period, state parties to the Statute might, depending on the
terms of the Security Council resolution, be prevented by the provisions of
the Charter from either triggering proceedings before the Court or rendering
co-operation to the Court under the Statute.504
9.5.2.3 Suspension of the continuece and commencement of
prosecution and investigations
As we have seen so far, the final Statute provides for a narrower role for the
Council than the ILC Draft. Its scope was however broadened in two
specific respects that will be discussed in this section. The first difference is
that while the ILC Draft only gives the Council the power to bar
prosecution, the final Statute states that prosecutions as well as
investigations can be barred. This means that the Council can bar the
Court505 from acting at an earlier stage. The preliminary examination or
analysis of the information phase proceeds the investigation phase.506 The
Prosecutor is thus not prevented from gathering information on the deferred
case. Secondly, unlike the ILC Draft, the suspension or prohibition would
apply not only to the commencement of a prosecution, but to the
commencement and continuance of prosecution. Under the final Statute
even once prosecution is underway, the Council can therefore step in and
call a halt to the proceedings. This means that the Council can interfere with
the work of the Court at a later stage. These changes in the text give the
Council broader powers in blocking the Courts work. Taken in the context
of the other changes, that is the reversed veto and the introduction of the 12-
months limit, there seems to be enough safeguards that the Council will not
abuse these powers. Instead these changes seems to be an acceptable
compromise in order to get through the more important changes that limited
the Council’s powers of deferral.
9.5.3 Meaning of the phrase “in a resolution adopted under
Chapter VII of the Charter”
It is clear that Article 16 does not mean that the Council will be able to have
a case deferred by simply coming to such a decision with the required
majority of votes. Instead it would have to adopt a resolution under Chapter
VII. The question of exactly how the phrase ”in a resolution adopted under
Chapter VII of the Charter” is to be interpreted is more difficult to answer.
                                                
504 For this discussion see R.S. Lee, The International Criminal Court, The Making of the
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As a minimum, the Council will have to make an Article 39 determination.
The situation, involving the alleged commission of the crimes falling within
the jurisdiction of the Court, would have to constitute, at least, a threat to the
peace. What the requirements are above this is however uncertain. It has
been suggested that every action of the Council on the basis of Chapter VII,
thus also the pure adoption of non-binding recommendations under Article
39 of the Charter, would be sufficient.507 It has also been suggested that the
Court would not have to take any action at all, but that it could be sufficient
that the Council made such a determination under Article 39.508 It is also
possible that the phrase will be interpreted to mean that the Council in fact
has to take measures according to Article 41 or 42.
It can be concluded that Article 16 differs from Article 13(b), in that in the
latter the phase “acting under Chapter VII” is used instead of the phrase “in
a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter.”509 A possible
argument is that “acting under” means that Article 39 as well as either
Article 41 or Article 42 come into play, whereas “in a resolution adopted
under” could simply imply the making of an Article 39 determination. There
is, however, no suggestion that this is what the drafters of the Statute had in
mind. As noticed in the previous, the exact way in which the Council should
adopt resolutions under or act under Chapter VII was not the foremost in the
minds of the negotiators at all. From the negotiating process it is however
possible to draw the conclusion that the idea behind the phrase in Article 16
was to ensure that the Council had to take a formal vote, in accordance with
Article 27 of the Charter, on the deferral of the Court’s proceedings, instead
of merely discussing a Chapter VII situation. Consequently, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the phrase does not impose a requirement on the
Council to decide on Article 41 or Article 42 measures to satisfy the
requirement of adopting a resolution under the Chapter. The interpretation
of the phrase will however remain unclear until the Court has been
established.
9.5.4 Grounds for making a request
In addition to adopt a resolution under Chapter VII, the Council has to make
a finding that Court proceedings in a particular situation would impede its
work in the field of international peace and security. Article 16 gives no
indication on the grounds on which the Security Council makes its request to
the Court. As mentioned, it is implicit that the Council makes such a request
of referral when it considers that the pursuit of an investigation or of a
prosecution would impede the exercise of its primary responsibility under
the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. In the
arguments for introducing the provision, peace negotiations were mentioned
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as an example of when the Courts prosecution could disrupt the work of the
Council. The Council is however free to decide, on a case to case basis, in
what situations they consider that Court proceedings would interfere with
their work. The text of the Article could not specify the grounds for a request
since such a provision could be seen as controlling the powers of the
Security Council. As stated before, the Statute as a legal instrument cannot
confer a new power on the Council, or indeed control the exercise of the
Council’s power under the UN Charter.
The Court does not have the power to make a substantive review of the
deferral decision.510 It is not possible for the Court to reject the grounds for
deferral, but the Council is the sole judge of this.511 In making such a
finding the Council is however bound by the limitations discussed in 6.6.
The legal limitations are extremely broad in scope and therefore not of a
great importance in this case. The political limitations on the Council’s
power are however of greater importance. A decision that grounds for a
deferral exist must be seen as a non-procedural matter and the veto rules in
Article 27(3) are therefore applicable. This means that any of the permanent
members, three of which have voted in favour of the Statute, can use its veto
power to prevent a decision stating that proceedings will disrupt the work of
the Council. The conclusion is that the Court has very broad powers in
deciding that grounds for a deferral exist, as long as there is unanimity
within the Council’s permanent member states.
                                                
510 G.H Oosthuizen, 1999, p.384
511 The Court however has a limited power of review, in that it can satisfy itself that the
Council in fact did request the Court to defer proceedings in accordance with Article 16.
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10 Conclusion
One of the major strengths, concerning the preconditions to the exercise of
jurisdictions, is the fact that the Rome Conference broke with the tradition
in international law that membership and jurisdiction are separated. In the
past, acceptance of jurisdiction has been subject to additional declaration or
state consent, but according to the Rome Statute automatic jurisdiction is the
main rule. In my opinion this was an important step to take. If membership
and jurisdiction were separated it could have taken very long before the
Court could have functioned effectively, and the Court would through this
have lost credibility. The arguments that automatic jurisdiction would
infringe national sovereignty were, in my view, not strong enough. They
were advocated by states that wanted to weaken the jurisdiction of the
Court. One has to remember that automatic jurisdiction does not mean that
the Court will have jurisdictional supremacy over national legal institution.
The principle of complementarity will adequately protect the legitimate state
interest.
Another strong point, that is closely related to the previous one, is that the
Statute does not require consent by the state of nationality, but only requires
that the state of nationality or the territorial state is party to the Statute or
gives its ad hoc consent. As stated earlier the United States did not approve
of this regime since they were afraid that the Court could exercise
jurisdiction over its nationals even if the US were not a party to the Statute.
They argued that the Statute would have few participants if some variant of
universal jurisdiction was embodied in it.  The US meant that, in the interest
of creating a strong Court with as many ratifications as possible, the Statute
should have included rules that the consent from the state of nationality
always was needed. In the choice between establishing a weak Court, where
the US would have participated, and a more ambitious Court, without the
US participation, I think that the right path was taken in choosing the latter.
If state consent was always required this could have totally paralysed the
Court. What the US wanted to create was basically a state and Security
Council-controlled permanent war crimes Court. I think that the Statute as it
stands now has bigger potentials to fulfil the expectations put on it. A Court
with too limited powers would, no matter how many ratification it got, be
too weak and in the end not worth creating. It was better to create a stronger
Court, and hope that the countries in favour of a weak Court will in time
ratify, instead of creating a weak Court and hope that in time it can be re-
negotiated to be given stronger powers.
As to the weaknesses concerning the preconditions to the exercise of
jurisdiction, Article 124 creates a de facto opt-out regime for war crimes if
states make use of it. The possibility of opting out will however only be a
transitional provision and I think this price was worth paying to secure the
French support.
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Another possible weak point is embodied in the rules on admissibility.
While the principle of complementarity in itself seems to be well balanced,
enabling states concerned with their sovereignty and primacy of national
proceedings to accept the Statute, there lies a weakness in the criteria on
which the Court must determine admissibility. The inability test could
become a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the judges. What the judges
have to do is to sit in judgement of an entire criminal justice system. The
judges may need to find ways to narrow the scope of their findings of
inability so that their credibility will not be harmed by persistent criticism by
victims and others on the ground of serious inconsistency. Also the question
of unwillingness can be troublesome. The question of deciding if the state is
acting in good faith is a complex jurisdiction matter that could nearly
paralyse the Court, especially in the early years. It remains to be seen how
the Court will interpret these criteria. The effectiveness of the Court will
depend on how much evidence of bad faith the judges demand of the
Prosecutor and how easily they are prepared to pierce a sham.
Another serious weakness is that the Statute does not provide for universal
jurisdiction. The application of universal jurisdiction in combination with
the principle of complementarity, and the other checks and balances in the
Statute, would have given the Court the best possibility to effectively fight
against impunity. The extension of universal jurisdiction to the Court would
not have violated the principle of state sovereignty or the primacy of
national jurisdiction. It would have given the Court the possibility to step in
when states were effectively unwilling or unable to try the perpetrators of
the crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court. It is also regrettable
that the Korean proposal was negotiated away. Requiring consent of one out
of four states, instead of as now, one out of two, would considerably have
improved the effectiveness and scope of the Court, especially with regard to
internal armed conflicts taking place in non-state parties. In civil wars the
present compromise provision does not allow for any jurisdiction unless the
state in question is a party to the Statue. If, in line with the Korean proposal,
it had also applied to the custodial state, this loophole could have been
avoided. Such a provision would have meant that the core crimes committed
during a civil war could have been prosecuted if the suspect had been
arrested in the state parties.
Under the present Statute there are however two ways in which these
negative effects of the Court not having universal jurisdiction can possibly
be mitigated, namely by widespread ratification by the states and by
sufficient referrals from the Security Council. First it can be concluded that
there would be no negative effects if the Statute obtain universal ratification,
and that the effects will be less relevant the more states that ratify the
Statute. The many signatories, 139 as of April 30, 2001, and the state
declarations in the negotiating process, speak for a wide support and suggest
that the Statute will be ratified by many states. In the early phase of the life
of the ICC there will however not be a widespread ratification. It is realistic
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to expect that the situations not involving the territory and citizens of the
state parties will be the rule, not the exception.
Another possibility to counter the effects of the Court not being competent
because the state in question is not party to the Statute, is through Security
Council referrals. Since the referral of a situation by the Council is based on
its Chapter VII power, which is binding on all UN member states, it will
allow the Court to dispense the admissibility requirements laid down in the
Statute. The Court will thus be able to exercise jurisdiction irrespectively of
whether the states concerned are parties to the Statute or not. This will be
particularly helpful to the Court in securing jurisdiction over crimes
committed in internal armed conflict and in situations where the state
concerned is not a party to the Statute. Referrals by the Security Council can
become an important source of work for the ICC, by extending its
jurisdictional reach to the whole world, including the territory and citizens
of non-state parties. How far this will be true, and to what extent the Council
will in fact refer situations, will depend on the Council’s powers under the
UN Charter and how the Council uses them in relation to the Court. First of
all it can be concluded that the Council has interpreted the concept of “threat
to the peace” in such a broad way that it covers all the crimes listed in
Article 5 of the Statute. The Council has also shown its willingness to
determine civil wars as threat to the peace, under the requirement that the
situations have consequences for international peace. In the creation of the
ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda we have also seen
that the Council has an interest, and consider it beneficial in some situations,
to require the submission to justice of those responsible for grave crimes of
international concern. Since it is easier to refer a situation than to create a
tribunal for each particular situation, it is probable that the Council will
make more use of its power of referral than it would have been willing to
create ad hoc tribunals, if it had been forced to continue on this path.
The weakness of Council referrals is however that the Council can be
paralysed by the veto of the permanent members when a situation involve
their nationals or those of their allies, even when such situations genuinely
deserve consideration by the Court. This might lead to double standards and
reduce the Court’s credibility. The fact that three of the five permanent
members have signed the Statute, and the fact that the use of the veto has
greatly decreased since the end of the Cold War, however suggest that this
fear is overrated. Also the fact that the Council refers “situations” and not
“cases”, and that it makes the referral to the Prosecutor, and not to the
judicial arm directly, speak against the fear of politisation of the Court.
In this context it is also worth to mention a few words about the Council’s
‘negative’ power to defer the Court’s jurisdiction. From a negative
standpoint one can conclude that the provision makes it possible for the
Council, as political body, to obstruct the course of justice. However, the
Court must have very good reasons to hamper the work of the independent
Court. The Council would need to make a public and politically sensitive
104
finding that the commencement or continuation of an investigation or
prosecution would be detrimental to international peace and security. It
requires the Council to publicly state its reasons for voting to halt the
Court’s proceeding. This would discourage overt and excessive intervention
by the Council.
One important strength concerning the trigger mechanism is that the
Prosecutor is given proprio motu power. He or she can seek information
from states, organs of the UN, intergovernmental and non-governmental
organisations. If the Prosecutors use these powers to seek information it
might have a very strong deterrent effect. The proprio motu power is also
important for the credibility of the Court. If only state parties and the
Security Council have the power to bring complaints the Court would run
the risk of being politicised. The Prosecutor is empowered to react to reports
at a very early stage. One risk is however that the capacity of the Prosecutor
is used, by members of the Security Council, as an excuse to reduce the
Council referral of situation to the Court. It is only the Security Council that
can empower the Prosecutor to conduct investigations and case preparation
more efficiently than the weak mode prescribed by the Statute. It is not
sufficient that the Prosecutor is able to act in timely manner through the
proprio motu power to initiate investigations. The Prosecutor still needs the
Security Council to act effectively.
As a concluding remark, I would like to state that the Statute has some
weaknesses than can affect the Court’s effectiveness, credibility, and
independence. As I see it, the threats to the independence and credibility are
less imminent than the threats to the effectiveness, that are posed by the
Court not having universal jurisdiction. There is a risk that the rejection of
universal jurisdiction might lead to that the Court becomes more of a
deterrent than a real enforcement mechanism of individual responsibility.
This can however be cured by the ratification by as many states as possible.
Since the Court will become stronger the more states that ratify the Statute,
those who want the Court to be effective should make every effort to ensure
that as many states accede as soon as possible. Although the Court may be
fragile at birth, it is likely that it will take on greater strengths with the
passage of time, and then be able to fulfil its task to replace a culture of
impunity with a culture of accountability for the most serious international
crimes.
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